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Prior research has found equity theory explains employee responses to falling wages in relation 
to other comparable workers.  The present research attempts to contribute to the criminal justice 
literature by directly testing equity theory within the policing context, something no study has 
done to date.  Applied to policing, equity theory predicts sworn officers employed by 
departments with falling or inequitable salaries (i.e., their salaries fail to keep up with those at 
other regional agencies) will reduce their work input (i.e., discretionary arrests) and/or quit in 
higher numbers than before (i.e., increase attrition).  The present study also attempts to quantify 
how far officer salaries can fall behind the mean regional police pay before a municipal agency 
experiences negative outcomes.  The research questions are examined using data from Criminal 
Justice Agency Profile (CJAP) Reports from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement 
(FDLE), with historical salary and attrition data for 122 municipal law enforcement agencies in 
Florida from 2001-2011, and Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Part II Arrest Data from the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for the same time period.  A time-series cross-sectional 
(TSCS) analysis is conducted over 11 annual data points.  This study attempts to bring an 
additional theory into the fold of the policing literature by testing it against a large, law 
enforcement specific data set.  This is in part an effort to answer the call for what has been 
described as a need for more theory in the criminal justice and policing literature (Cooper & 
Worrall, 2012; Mears, 2010).  It should also enable police administrators to gauge, relative to 
regional competitor salaries, at what point to anticipate negative consequences from the 
underpaid condition of police officers working at their municipal police agencies.  The findings 
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suggest Florida municipal police officers do not reduce their work inputs, as measured by UCR 
Part II arrests, but do quit their jobs in larger numbers in response to stagnant or falling salaries 
as predicted by equity theory.  Policy implications include a better understanding by police 
administrators as to what they can expect and prepare for when municipal police officers’ 






I would like to thank all of my committee members, in the order they signed on to help 
me: Dr. Jacinta Gau, Dr. Eugene Paoline, Dr. Ross Wolf and Dr. Robert Folger.  Their 
generosity, lending me their time and expertise, helped shape and improve my final work product 
into something better than I would have created on my own.  Dr. Wolf took on this responsibility 
without any need to do so, bringing the rare mix of both practical and academic experience.  Dr. 
Folger took on the typically unenviable responsibility as the “outside” expert lending his time 
from the College of Business Administration to help me.  In additional to expert critiques, he 
provided personal insights about many of the researchers whose work is referenced in this study.  
Dr. Paoline provided extensive, detailed commentary in a very tactful, useful manner.  Finally I 
would like to especially thank my dissertation chair, Dr. Jacinta Gau, for the substantial time 
commitment she gave towards my dissertation, including no less than 7 very time consuming and 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... ix 
LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................... x 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1 
Study Problem ............................................................................................................................. 1 
Study Methodology ..................................................................................................................... 3 
Significance of the Study ............................................................................................................ 3 
Organization of the Dissertation ................................................................................................. 4 
CHAPTER TWO: EQUITY THEORY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE ........................................... 6 
Overview ..................................................................................................................................... 6 
Origins ......................................................................................................................................... 8 
Responses to Inequity.................................................................................................................. 9 
Empirical Tests of Equity Theory ............................................................................................. 11 
Attrition in Response to Underpayment ............................................................................... 11 
Reduced Work Input in Response to Underpayment ............................................................ 13 
Testing of Overpayment ....................................................................................................... 16 
More Recent Testing of Equity Theory ................................................................................ 18 
Equity Theory Tested Longitudinally ................................................................................... 21 
vii 
 
Equity Theory in Criminal Justice and Criminology Research................................................. 24 
Equity Theory in Crime and Punishment.............................................................................. 24 
Equity Theory in Policing ..................................................................................................... 26 
Police Organizational and Job Satisfaction Literature .............................................................. 28 
CHAPTER THREE:  RESEARCH QUESTIONS, DATA AND METHODS ............................ 33 
Current Study ............................................................................................................................ 33 
Equity Theory Suggested Longitudinal Design .................................................................... 33 
Research Questions ................................................................................................................... 34 
Unit of Analysis and Study Population ..................................................................................... 34 
Data Sources .............................................................................................................................. 36 
Criminal Justice Agency Profile (CJAP) Data Set ............................................................... 36 
Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Data Set .......................................................................... 38 
Variables.................................................................................................................................... 39 
Independent Variables ............................................................................................................... 41 
Officer Salary Compared to Regional Agencies ................................................................... 41 
Dependent Variables ................................................................................................................. 47 
Agency UCR Part II Arrests per Officer ............................................................................... 47 
Agency Attrition ................................................................................................................... 49 
Control Variables ...................................................................................................................... 51 
viii 
 
Research Design ........................................................................................................................ 53 
Statistical Analysis .................................................................................................................... 54 
Time-Series Cross-Sectional Analysis .................................................................................. 55 
Plan of the Analysis................................................................................................................... 65 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS ..................................................................................................... 66 
CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION ................................................................................................. 87 
Policing: Theory Implications ................................................................................................... 88 
Police Management: Policy and Practice Implications ............................................................. 90 
Limitations ................................................................................................................................ 94 
Future Research ......................................................................................................................... 97 
APPENDIX A GROUP BASED TRAJECTORY MODELING ............................................... 100 
Group Based Trajectory Modeling .......................................................................................... 101 
APPENDIX B PANEL DATA ANALYSIS .............................................................................. 104 
Panel Data Analysis ................................................................................................................ 105 
APPENDIX C METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS..................................................... 107 
Florida Metropolitan Statistical Areas .................................................................................... 108 
APPENDIX D UCR PART II ARRESTS .................................................................................. 110 
Examples of Part II Arrests ..................................................................................................... 111 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................... 112 
ix 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.  Florida metropolitan statistical areas map. .................................................................. 46 
x 
 
LIST OF TABLES   
Table 1 Definitions of Variables and Data Sources ..................................................................... 40 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics........................................................................................................ 68 
Table 3 Determinants of Part II Arrests per Officer at Florida Municipal Police Agencies, 2001-
2011............................................................................................................................................... 73 
Table 4 Determinants of Officer Attrition at Florida Municipal Police Agencies, 2001-2011 .... 76 
Table 5 Determinants of Part II Arrests per Officer at Florida Municipal Police Agencies, 2001-
2011............................................................................................................................................... 79 
Table 6 Determinants of Officer Attrition at Florida Municipal Police Agencies, 2001-2011 .... 81 
Table 7 2008 Only Regression for Agency Part II Arrests per Officer versus 2001-2011 ........... 83 
Table 8 2008 Only Regression for Officer Attrition versus 2001-2011 ........................................ 85 




CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Study Problem 
 As the United States experiences a time of tight and sometimes shrinking budgets, tough 
financial decisions will need to be made to balance government budgets.  The federal 
government continues to carry an annual budget deficit and the national debt keeps growing 
(Montgomery, 2013).  While the country’s economy overall is beginning to show signs it is 
emerging from the recession that began in 2008, state and local governments, like the federal 
government, continue to experience budget shortfalls.  In many cases they have hidden structural 
problems, such as hefty pension obligations, that are likely to continue to pressure their budgets  
(Lyman & Williams Walsh, 2014).   
These budget pressures are likely to require tough budget decisions to befall municipal 
police forces, particularly a lack of pay raises and in some cases, pay cuts and terminations.  The 
mayor, city manager, police commissioner, police chief or other police administrator must guess 
the consequences of holding stagnant or cutting back police salaries.  He or she can make more 
informed budget decisions if research has quantified the results of police officers’ salaries falling 
behind salaries of their regional counterparts.  Therefore, it becomes valuable to not only 
distinguish the degree to which the stagnation of officers’ salaries has a real measurable effect 
but also to identify the threshold for which the lack of pay increases yields significant negative 
consequences for the city and police agency.    
2 
 
 Equity theory provides an opportunity to understand the consequences of salary inequity.  
This theory has been extensively tested in the industrial and organizational psychology literature, 
but not in the policing context.  The empirical findings document the effect of the theory to be 
“generally quite strong,” particularly for explaining the responses of underpaid or under 
rewarded workers (Greenberg, 1990b, p. 401).  Equity theory explains why underpaid workers 
tend to quit (Valenzi & Andrews, 1971) and/or do less work (Pritchard, Dunnette, & Gorgenson, 
1972) in response to inequitable salaries.  This application of equity theory drives both of the 
current study’s working hypotheses:   
Hypothesis 1 (H1): A municipal police agency’s pay scale falling behind other regional 
municipal police agencies leads to decreased work input. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): A municipal police agency’s pay scale falling behind other regional 
municipal police agencies leads to increased attrition. 
 Findings from the current study should enable police managers to quantify how, if at all, 
wages falling behind regional counterparts affect their agency.  The study may find, for example, 
that wages can fall slightly below the regional average without engendering negative effects, but 
a substantial gap of more than one standard deviation from the mean has consequences for the 
agency.  Police managers may gain better insight into how to fight or counter the ill-effects of 
falling wages with alternative means to make the job more satisfying and bring equity back into 
balance.  Additionally, the findings may incentivize police managers to offer competitive starting 




 This is a quasi-experimental study consisting of a time-series cross-sectional analysis 
(TSCS) using data from Florida municipal police agencies from 2001-2011.  Police agencies are 
the unit of analysis.  It is important to note that while many of the variables in this study could be 
applied to an individual analysis, this study is focused on the outcomes experienced by municipal 
police agencies.  Differences in outcomes are compared among agencies.  Salary and attrition 
data are gathered from the Criminal Justice Agency Profile (CJAP) Reports for municipal law 
enforcement agencies in Florida from 2001-2011 to generate the variables.  Work input, as 
measured by the largely discretionary arrests of Part II crimes, are gathered from the FBI 
Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Reports from 2001-2011.  Regional police recruiting areas will 
be defined by the geographic boundaries of the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) for given 
municipality.  
Significance of the Study 
 The present study benefits from the use of longitudinal data that consists of municipal 
law enforcement agencies, of varying size, within each MSA in Florida over the course of 11 
years to examine police officer responses to wages falling below regional averages. It also 
benefits from the application of equity theory, a theoretically deficient area in policing.  
Researchers such as Mastrofski (2004) have called for more theory in policing. The present study 
attempts, in part, to respond to such calls by testing a well-established theory in a policing 
context to determine if it is useful in explaining police officers’ responses to their changing 
organizational environment.  This analysis also provides an opportunity to test equity theory over 
time, which has been noted as generally lacking (Mitchell & James, 2001) in the otherwise 
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robust body of research (Cosier & Dalton, 1983; Vecchio, 1982).  As an added benefit, police 
chiefs should be able to gain insight into resource allocation decisions, particularly as it relates to 
officer salaries.   
Organization of the Dissertation 
 Chapter 1 discusses the need for municipal police managers to have a better and more 
empirically-driven understanding of when to be concerned about stagnant or falling officer 
salaries and what to expect as a result.   In addition, the first chapter includes the purpose of the 
study, an explanation of the research methodology (TSCS with a large data set), and a discussion 
of the contribution of the study to the existent policing literature. 
 Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical framework of the study.  This chapter provides an 
overview of equity theory and its origins, as well as the empirical research of the responses to 
both the underpayment and overpayment conditions in an exchange relationship.  The chapter 
also discusses police officer work product and the extent of the longitudinally testing of equity 
theory.  A review of the literature pertinent to equity theory in criminal justice research, officer 
pay and police organizational research is also presented. 
 Chapter 3 consists of the independent and dependent variables, the choice of a 
longitudinal design for the study, the study research questions and hypothesis.  It also provides a 
discussion of the research design, unit of analysis, and the data sets used for the study.  Further, a 
description of the variables is presented and the choice of TSCS is explained and supported.   
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 Chapter 4 reports the descriptive analysis of the data and detailed explanations of the 
steps employed to analyze the data.  The results of the TSCS analysis and the related statistical 
techniques utilized are also presented and discussed.   
 Chapter 5 contains a discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of the study.  




CHAPTER TWO: EQUITY THEORY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
Overview 
 According to equity theory (Adams, 1963, 1965), fairness or balance is desired by 
individuals in an exchange relationship.  The exchange relationship consists of inputs and 
outcomes.  Inputs are defined as “the participant’s contributions to the exchange, which are seen 
(by a scrutineer) as entitling him to reward or cost” and outcomes are defined as, “the positive 
and negative consequences that a scrutineer perceives a participant has received in the course of 
his relationship with another” (Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978, pp. 11-12).   In an 
employee-to-employer relationship, the employee’s inputs typically include his or her level of 
education, applicable training, advanced skills, intelligence, experience and on the job work 
effort (Adams, 1965, pp. 276-277).  Employee inputs occasionally include arguably less rational 
or sometimes unspoken contributions such as attractiveness or good health (Adams, 1965, p. 
277).  Positive outcomes in an employee-to-employer relationship typically include, “pay, 
rewards intrinsic to the job, satisfying supervision, seniority benefits, fringe benefits, job status 
and status symbols, and a variety of formally and informally sanctioned prerequisites, such as the 
right of a higher-status person to park his car in a privileged location” while negative outcomes 
include, “poor working conditions, monotony, [and] fate uncertainty” (Adams, 1965, p. 278).   
 Equity theory explains why participants in an exchange relationship, such as an 
employee-to-employer relationship, believe their individual contributions should be reflected 
with rewards of equal value in return (Adams, 1965; Homans, 1974; Walster et al., 1978).  In an 
employee-to-employer relationship, employees evaluate the fairness of their exchange with the 
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employer by comparing what they contribute -  their inputs such as work effort, skill set and 
education - to their outcomes such as pay, status and privileges, to co-workers or other 
comparable workers outside the company (Cowherd & Levine, 1992).  For example, employee A 
has a strong work ethic, advanced professional certificates and a master’s degree.  If employee A 
notices a colleague in a comparable position at an outside employer who has a poor work ethic, 
fewer advanced technical certificates, no graduate degree and earns an equal or higher salary, 
employee A naturally feels undercompensated.  This sense of under compensation, or the 
antithesis of overcompensation, is referred to as inequity in an exchange relationship according 
to equity theory.  Equity theory predicts the presence of this situation in an exchange relationship 
will lead to a reaction by one or both parties to reestablish balance in the relationship. As 
described by Cowherd and Levine (1992, p. 303):   
When individuals perceive that their ratio of inputs to outcomes is similar to that of their 
comparative referents, they feel that equity exists. Dissimilar ratios lead to perceptions of 
inequity. People attempt to reduce the distress caused by inequity in three ways. First, 
individuals may change their perceptions of either their own or their reference group's 
inputs and outcomes. Second, individuals can alter their actual inputs (e.g., decrease their 
work effort) or outcomes (e.g., get a pay raise). Finally, individuals can end inequitable 
relationships by leaving their organizations.   
When an employee in an exchange relationship experiences inequity, or feels his or her inputs do 
not equal his or her outcomes, he or she will experience a tension state and take steps to re-
establish balance in the relationship and relieve the tension or end the relationship.   
 Equity theory is important to organizational psychology as it was the first general theory 
to attempt to integrate many “mini-theories” of social behavior (Berkowitz & Walster, 1976).  
While “mini-theories” with lots of exceptions and limitations can be difficult to remember and 
confusing for the practitioner to apply, a general theory with broad brushstrokes allows 
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researchers to provide simple, practical advice that is easy to apply.  Although it was intended for 
application to all types of exchange relationships, Adams’ (1963, 1965) equity theory has 
historically found the most attention from social scientists in its application to organizational 
settings, particularly the relationship between employees and their employers (Greenberg, 
1990b).   
Origins 
 The earliest roots of equity theory can be traced to Aristotle who described the 
importance, “…to divide the distributive honor or reward into parts which are to one another as 
the merits of the persons who are to participate" (Ross, 1966, p. 1131).  Its more modern history 
can be found in Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance which specifies when inequity 
arises and the options a person has available to respond. Homans (1961, 1974) argues equity is 
based on an expectation he refers to as “the rule of distributive justice” and argues that 
expectation is learned from experience.  The rule is satisfied when “the ratio of the measures of 
the persons is equal to the ratio of the measures of their respective rewards” or, in other words, if 
two people are equal they should receive equal awards (Homans, 1974, p. 249).   
 Blau (1964) agreed with Homans’ distributive justice definition, but he disagrees about 
how justice originates.  He argues that justice is derived from a social norm of “fairness” which 
requires justice as a matter of moral principle (Blau, 1964).  Adams (1963, 1965) expands 
Homans’(1961) social concepts to focus on employer-to-employee exchange relationships.  He 
also focuses on reasons for, and responses to, a lack of equity to a greater extent than Blau 
(1964).   
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 Walster et al. (1978) consolidated the work of distributive justice and identified how 
equity theory could be applied to different types of settings.  They did this to provide a general 
outline of a new theory (Cohen & Greenberg, 1982).  Walster et al.’s (1978, p. 2) equity theory 
integrates portions of exchange theory, reinforcement theory, psychoanalytic theory, and 
cognitive consistency theory.  Equity theory is composed of four parsimonious propositions as 
described by Walster et al. (1978, p. 6), including:   
PROPOSITION I:  Individuals will try to maximize their outcomes (where outcomes 
equal rewards minus costs).  
 
PROPOSITION IIA: Groups can maximize collective reward by evolving accepted 
systems for equitably apportioning resources among members.  Thus, groups will evolve 
such systems of equity, and will attempt to induce members to accept and adhere to these 
systems.  PROPOSITION IIB:  Groups will generally reward members who treat others 
equitably, and generally punish (increase the costs for) members who treat others 
inequitably.   
 
PROPOSITION III:  When individuals find themselves participating in inequitable 
relationships, they will become distressed.  The more inequitable the relationship, the 
more distress individuals will feel.   
 
PROPOSITION IV:  Individuals who discover they are in an inequitable relationship will 
attempt to eliminate their distress by restoring equity.  The greater the inequity that exists, 
the more distress they will feel, and the harder they will try to restore equity.   
 
Responses to Inequity 
 According to Walster et al. (1978), equity theory explains the following:  When a worker 
feels his or her inputs are not equal to his or her outcomes, the worker perceives the inequity and 
attempts to correct it.  Inequity in pay causes workers distress.  In response, workers have two 
general categories of coping strategies available to them: restore either actual equity or 
“psychological equity” (Walster et al., 1978, p. 119).  Actual equity consists of things one can 
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see or measure in an exchange such as items produced, quality of work, employee theft, attrition, 
etc.  Psychological equity is the personal view of the net equity or inequity of a relationship. One 
example is an employee who reevaluates their feelings of equity internally and thinks to oneself 
that the outcomes or net compensation he or she is getting equates to a fair deal, even though 
nothing has actually changed.   
 Actual equity responses by workers differ for piece workers (i.e., workers paid per item 
produced or service rendered and not specifically for time spent working) versus workers paid on 
an hourly or salary basis.  Underpaid workers who are compensated on an hourly or salary basis 
tend to restore actual equity by producing a lower quality work product and less of it (Adams & 
Rosenbaum, 1962).  This type of effort is anticipated by equity theory as a response to stagnant 
or falling wages.  This may not be a sufficient test of equity theory as not all workers respond in 
this way under all conditions.  Some researchers have critiqued Adams’ work after finding only 
partial or no support for restoration of equity by an employee lowering his or her work 
production in experiments (Walster et al., 1978, p. 128).  Restoration of equity by doing less 
work is not the only response to pay inequity.  Valenzi and Andrews (1971) replicated overpaid 
and underpaid conditions and found no signs of actual equity restoration through changes in 
work production but did find 27% of those they underpaid quit while none of those they overpaid 
quit.   
 The distinction between actual and psychological responses to inequality is important in 
equity theory as it provides an explanation for employees who do not appear to outwardly 
respond to being overpaid or underpaid.  A psychological equity response is essentially a 
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participant’s re-evaluation of the exchange relationship which brings the employee to the 
conclusion the interaction he or she originally thought was unfair may actually be fair.  This idea, 
proposed by Vroom (1964), is explained as a more practical response by overpaid workers over 
time.  After initial efforts to create equity by manipulating actual equity, these workers would 
likely find such efforts far more tiring than simply re-framing their view of the situation and 
coming to agreement with their employers that they deserve their high pay.   
Empirical Tests of Equity Theory 
 Equity theory predicts human responses to an inequality of outcomes condition in an 
exchange relationship.  This inequality can manifest itself in one of two directions: 
underpayment or overpayment.  The overpayment condition has been tested more extensively 
than the underpayment condition.  This may be in part due to the opinion of some reviewers, and 
perhaps some researchers, that the predicted responses for the underpayment condition of equity 
theory are obvious while the predicted responses for the overpayment condition are not (Akerlof 
& Yellen, 1990; Goodman & Friedman, 1971).  The anticipated underpayment responses of 
equity theory have been tested with research generally finding support for the theory in this 
condition (Adams & Freedman, 1976, p. 47).   
Attrition in Response to Underpayment 
 Empirical testing of equity theory of workers in the employment field has generally 
found inequitably treated employees are at higher risk for attrition.  For example, in an hourly 
wage test of pay inequity by Valenzi and Andrews (1971, p. 1), thirty one college students who 
were searching for work were hired for short term, part-time clerical work and paid an hourly 
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wage.  All of the participants indicated the pay was fair for the job when they started.  However, 
after the first work session, the employees were divided into three groups, an underpaid group, 
an overpaid group and a control group whose pay remained the same.  Each of the employees 
was told about the unequal pay scale for the exact same work task as the other employees to 
explicitly highlight the pay inequity.  Participants were informed that the pay inequity was not 
due to their individual performance as a worker, but rather as a result of a random selection to 
meet an arbitrary budgeting requirement which was out of the employer’s control.  While there 
was no measured change in the employees work product, 27% of those in the underpaid 
condition quit the job while the groups of the other two pay conditions suffered no attrition at all.  
This study lends support to the idea that employees in an inequitable pay condition may suffer 
greater rates of attrition.   
 In another example, Finn and Lee (1972) administered a questionnaire to Federal Public 
Health Service non-supervisory, professional employees measuring work history, perception of 
job inputs, salary, and job-related attitudes.  The immediate supervisors of the participating 
employees also completed a separate, supervisor specific questionnaire.  Using a multiple-
regression model, the results showed inequitably treated study employees were found to be more 
likely to quit their job than equitably treated study employees.  
 In a study of 117 undergraduate students, the participants were assigned to a proofreading 
task where they had an anticipated pay scale based on prior experience for participation in the 
university’s psychological experiments (Austin & Walster, 1974).  The researchers then 
manipulated the pay for three groups into underpaid, equitably paid and overpaid conditions.  
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Consistent with equity theory, equitably paid employees were the most content while underpaid 
employees were the most distressed.  In summary, there is empirical support for predictions 
based on equity theory.  Specifically, underpayment by employers leads to employee distress and 
increased attrition.   
Reduced Work Input in Response to Underpayment 
 Research has shown that underpayment in an exchange relationship is, “largely in accord 
with [equity] theory,” and efforts to reduce those inequities to include doing less work (Adams & 
Freedman, 1976, p. 47).  In an underpayment experiment, Lawler and O'Gara (1967) hired 40 
college students for a short term interview task.  Half were paid an equitable rate for each 
interview conducted while the other half were severely underpaid at approximately 60% less.  
The results found the underpaid employees conducted more interviews, but of measurably lower 
quality than those employees who were paid the equitable rate.  The same has been found to be 
true for hourly paid workers as well.   
 The underpaid employee condition has also been tested in studies that also include other 
employees in the overpaid condition being evaluated simultaneously within the same experiment.  
In a study of 96 university students given tasks to complete for piecework pay, the participants 
were divided into three pay scales of underpaid, equitably paid and overpaid.  As predicted by 
equity theory the underpaid employees produced a lower quality work product and attempted to 
compensate for their underpaid status by producing a higher quantity of product (Andrews, 
1967).  In another study involving 64 college students divided into three pay groups, hourly 
wages were paid in the underpaid, equitably paid and overpaid conditions.  The classification of 
14 
 
the three pay categories was based on ability after testing.  Underpaid employees consistently 
produced lower quality work then their equitably paid counterparts as supported by equity theory 
(Evan & Simmons, 1969).   
 Leventhal and Bergman (1969) split payment for a work task between two workers who 
equally contributed to the task and then purposely manipulated inequity in the payment for the 
job.  They found a worker’s level of concern about his or her underpayment was greatest when 
his or her portion of the payment received was between 15-30% of the job’s total payment 
instead of an equitable split between two people of 50% each.  An interesting discovery also 
found in the study was that a minority of the workers who received 14% or less total 
compensation split two ways with an equally contributing coworker, shunned a small token of 
upward adjustment to their pay.   
 Employing 120 undergraduate students, Kahn (1972) employed the participants to work 
at individual proofreading tasks.  Although they each had their own assignments, the student 
employees were told their work was graded together and they were given one payment for their 
collective effort.  This left the students to determine how to divide up the pay amongst them.  
Students were placed in underpaid, equitably paid and overpaid conditions through the use of 
bogus performance reports of each employee’s work product for each assignment.  Equity theory 
was supported by the results of the study as employees in the overpaid condition, with poor 
performance reports on their work efforts, agreed to take a smaller share of the group payment.  
At the same time employees in the underpaid condition, with excellent performance reports on 
their work efforts, agreed to take a greater amount.  However, those in the overpaid condition did 
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not give up enough pay to properly reflect their contributions and those in the underpaid 
condition did not agree to a larger amount that properly reflected their efforts accordingly.  This 
indicated that when working directly with another person, there may be some inherent desire to 
equally distribute pay regardless of actual contributions.  
 In an experiment, 253 college students were hired to work on a clerical task for half a day 
for seven consecutive days, with half the days paid for through hourly compensation.  The 
underpaid and overpaid conditions were manipulated by telling participants who applied for the 
job that there was a misprint in the employment advertisement, either above or below the 
advertise wage.  A simple clerical task of identifying and circling select prices on a computer 
printout created a situation where the quality of the work product was either 100% correct or 
incorrect.  With hourly employees in the underpaid condition, a marked decrease in employee 
performance was observed.  Additionally employees in the underpaid condition also reported 
feeling less satisfied than employees in the equitably paid condition (Pritchard et al., 1972).   
 Garland (1973) also found support for equity theory when piece rate work was distributed 
to underpaid, equitably paid and overpaid groups.  The underpaid workers produced lower 
quality and more quantity in an effort to increase their take home pay.  The results in the 
underpaid condition were found to be true for both male and female employees; however they 
differed in the overpaid condition with males increasing the quality of their work product over 
those equitably paid.  Meanwhile, overpaid females produced approximately the same quality 
work product as those equitably paid.  Once again, in the underpaid condition, empirical research 
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generally supports equity theory’s prediction that workers will do less and lower quality work in 
an effort to create equity in their exchange relationship with their employer.     
Testing of Overpayment 
 Lawler, Koplin, Young, and Fadem (1968) tested overpayment during three separate 
work sessions spread out over six days by hiring temporary workers to conduct interviews.  They 
calculated the quality of work, quantity of work, and captured the views of the employees via a 
questionnaire each work day.  The researchers followed the same practice of Adams and 
Rosenbaum (1962) to manipulate the apparent wage discrepancy between the temporary 
workers.  Some employees were given the impression they were receiving wages equal to their 
peers while others were given the impression they were being overpaid.  As predicted by equity 
theory, overpaid employees attempted to offset their inequitable pay on the first day by 
producing a work product quality that was well above their equitably paid counterparts, but by 
the second and third day the quality fell to a comparable level while their questionnaires 
reflected a change in attitude, a psychological change, with a greater belief they were actually 
deserving of their higher pay (Lawler et al., 1968).  This study demonstrated support for a very 
short life cycle of equity theory’s predicted overpayment response.   
 Goodman and Friedman (1968) hired 73 male undergraduate students to work as short-
term research coders to test the overpayment condition predicted by equity theory.  In the hourly 
overpayment condition, the researchers found support for equity theory as overpaid workers 
produced greater quantity of work product than did equitably paid workers.  Additionally, after 
the researchers verbally introduced a known manufacturing rate to the workers, production 
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variance was minimized.  This attempt by the employees to more closely match their work 
performance, as it related to their pay condition to the known production rate, provided 
additional evidence of over performance by the overpaid workers.   
 In an example of the mixed empirical support for equity theory in the overpayment 
condition, Evans and Molinari (1970) found a lack of support for equity theory’s predicted 
overpayment response after manipulating the job security situation of employees.   The 
researchers hired 32 people for the study, 11 of whom were students, for short-term, part-time 
work conducting interviews.  Under conditions in which an employee was made to feel his or her 
job security was at stake, workers in both the underpaid and the overpaid condition responded 
with high quality-low quantity work, a response predicted by equity theory only for overpaid 
piece rate workers (Evans & Molinari, 1970, p. 113).  This study has been viewed as evidence 
that early studies, such as Lawler et al. (1968), did not find support for equity theory in the 
overpayment condition.  Many of these studies were likely measuring lowered self-esteem and 
not inequity as intended when these types of studies told participants they were under qualified 
(and therefore overpaid) as opposed to being actually under qualified (Carrell & Dittrich, 1978, 
p. 204).  
 In a study testing equity theory in the overpayment condition, Deci (1972) found support 
for equity theory.  Testing 96 undergraduates, the subjects were asked to solve a series of puzzles 
and were left alone for eight minutes before they were asked to formally begin work.  The 
subjects were divided into three groups; one group received no compensation, one received 
payment after the work period for each puzzle completed and one received payment in advance 
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for an overly optimistic anticipation of puzzles likely to be completed prior to the eight minute 
wait period and the formally assigned work period.  As predicted, the students paid in advance 
for work not yet done responded to the overpaid condition by spending the most time working on 
the puzzles by utilizing the eight minute waiting period to get their puzzle solving started early.   
 Pritchard et al. (1972) also found support for equity theory’s predicted response to the 
overpayment condition.  In their study of 253 undergraduate student employees hired for short 
term clerical work, overpaid workers returned higher worker performance than their underpaid 
co-workers.  The overpaid employees also reported being less satisfied than their equitably paid 
counterparts, as predicted by equity theory.   
 Schmitt and Marwell (1972) attempted to test some of the critiques of equity theory’s 
ability to predict workers’ responses to the overpaid condition.  Undergraduates were hired to be 
paid participants in a laboratory task and were assigned to work on a task with one other person.  
When given the choice between working together as a team, but with drastically inequitable pay 
rates, or the option for both workers to take slightly less pay to work alone, most workers chose 
to work alone.  This included those in the overpaid condition.  When given an opportunity to 
transfer a portion of their pay to create equity in pay with their coworker, a majority of workers 
in the overpaid condition eventually transferred enough pay to create partial or total equity 
(Schmitt & Marwell, 1972, p. 207).  
More Recent Testing of Equity Theory 
 By the late 1980’s researchers became more interested in what equity theory did not 
offer; the reasons why two people may respond differently to the same inequity, particularly if 
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they have different beliefs or understandings about how or why the inequity occurred 
(Cropanzano & Folger, 1989).  This interest led to a boom of research in the 1990’s discussing 
procedural justice, interactional justice, organizational justice, referent cognitions, fairness and 
other theories in similar areas.    
 Equity theory and in particular its idea of distributive justice, was one of several theories 
that, “helped set the stage for the study of procedural justice” (Lind & Tyler, 1988, p. 10).  The 
reach of branches extending from the equity theory distributive justice research foundations has, 
in part, influenced the development of procedural justice, interactional justice, organizational 
justice, referent cognitions and by extension, fairness theory.  Procedural justice involves the 
study of the process or the procedures by which participants’ outcomes are determined, and how 
those processes influence their actual equity responses for better or worse (Leventhal, Karuza, & 
Fry, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975).  Interactional justice, a type of procedural justice, involves 
the study of exchange participants’ perceptions of the interpersonal handling of organizational 
changes or procedures and the variation of outcomes different interpersonal approaches provide 
(Bies, 1986).  Organizational justice combines distributive justice, procedural justice and 
interactional justice to study employees’ overall perceptions of decisions that organizations make 
such as organizational policies, standard practices and events (Greenberg, 1987).  Referent 
cognitions theory states the past history of treatment towards referent others, implicit promises 
and explicit promises determine to what degree an exchange participant is dissatisfied with an 
outcome (Folger, 1987, 1993).  Finally, fairness theory, building upon referent cognitions theory, 
is a global theory of fairness that explains a person feels their outcome is unfair when they 
perceive a better outcome was possible if another, who is the focus of scrutiny or judgment, 
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failed to follow expected standards and therefore should have performed better and could have 
more positively influenced his or her outcomes (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998, 2001).   
 In the late 1980’s Huseman, Hatfield, and Miles (1987) developed a construct called 
equity sensitivity, based on equity theory, that argued individual reactions to equity or inequity 
are a result of unique preferences for different input/outcome ratios.  This work classified 
individuals into one of three classes: benevolents who expect their input/outcome ratios to be less 
than referents,  sensitives who prefer equity in comparison to referents, and entitleds who prefer 
their input/outcome ratios to be more than referents (Huseman et al., 1987, p. 223).  This work 
lends support that the present study may find only some employees, but not all, respond to an 
inequitable salary condition.  In an effort to combine equity theory and social exchange theory, 
Akerlof and Yellen (1990, p. 255) proposed the fair wage-effort hypothesis which states workers 
“proportionately withdraw” their effort as their wages fall short of their equitable wage.    
 In general, most of the tests of equity theory have been supportive of its predictions 
(Ambrose & Kulik, 1999; Bolino & Turnley, 2008; Greenberg, 1990b; Greenberg & Cohen, 
1982; Mowday, 1987).  It is important to note the support though generous, is not entirely 
without criticism (Leventhal et al., 1980; Miner, 1984).  As summarized by Bolino and Turnley 
(2008), the criticisms are most typically as follows: types of responses by individuals are not 
well specified; the theory is better equipped to predict responses to under reward than over 
reward; it does not take into account other types of distributive rules beyond equity such as 
equality based, needs based or hierarchy based and it fails to take into account interactional or 
procedural justice (Ambrose & Kulik, 1999; Fiske, 1992; Folger, 1986; Greenberg, 1990b; 
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Leventhal et al., 1980; Mowday, 1987).  Even with its criticisms, equity theory is still considered 
one of the most important organizational behavior theories (Miner, 2003). 
Equity Theory Tested Longitudinally 
 Most tests of equity theory have been cross sectional in nature.  Only a few studies 
testing the theory focused on the employee-employer relationship with multiple units over time.  
Greenberg (1990a) studied two factories that were forced to accept 15% wage cuts for 10 weeks.  
Theft data was available for 10 weeks prior and 10 weeks after in the affected factories, plus a 
control factory that was not subject to the pay cut.  Using a 3 x 3 mixed-design ANOVA, the 
study found employee theft significantly increased during the 10 weeks of the pay cut.  Although 
the study’s greatest value was in its analysis of adequate versus inadequate explanations of pay 
cuts, the author finds, “The data support equity theory’s predictions regarding the likely 
responses to underpayment”  (Greenberg, 1990a, p. 561).   
 Using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, Harder (1991) compared the performance 
of free agents, excluding pitchers, in Major League Baseball’s 1977-1980 seasons to a random 
sample of non-free agent players and found support for equity theory.  He found that under 
conditions of an inequitable salary, free-agent players did not reduce their work performance in a 
manner that might harm their future salary opportunities, but interestingly they did not show 
increases in those performance areas, such as home runs, that would have provided a large 
inequitable benefit to their employing baseball team (Harder, 1991).   
 In their two wave longitudinal study of teachers, Taris, Van Horn, Schaufeli, and 
Schreurs (2004, p. 119) could not draw a conclusion regarding the magnitude of the effect of 
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equity theory on pay disparity and recommended future researchers use, “a longitudinal design 
with more than two waves.”  In a longitudinal study of more than 400 employees in Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania in the services sector with annual observation points over four years, 
Carraher (2011) found equity theory was able to explain variation in turnover over time using 24 
binary logistic regressions for four time periods using six samples for each one.   
 In another employee-to-employer relationship study, more than 400 professional Chinese 
baseball players with annual data for 18 years found significant, but very limited support of, 
equity theory through external pay equity as measured by team performance (Jane, 2011).  The 
same study found internal pay equity, or equal pay among all members on the same team, for 
pitchers had a negative effect on team performance, but there was no internal pay equity effect 
for hitters.  This lead the researcher to conclude internal pay equity was likely important in 
positions requiring cooperation which on a baseball team includes nearly everyone, except for 
pitchers (Jane, 2011).   
 Equity theory has also been tested longitudinally in some other employee contexts apart 
from the employee-employer relationships addressed in the present study.  In a two wave 
longitudinal study examining professional-recipient relationships and burnout among human 
service professionals, van Dierendonck, Schaufeli, and Buunk (2001) found support for equity 
theory as feelings of being more advantaged or more deprived in a professional-recipient 
relationship led to higher emotional exhaustion levels in the future.  A five year, two wave 
longitudinal study of 207 doctors in the Netherlands found a lack of reciprocity in doctor-patient 
relationships led to burnout lending support for both equity theory and social exchange over time 
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(Bakker, Schaufeli, Sixma, Bosveld, & Dierendonck, 2000).  Studying 466 university employees 
at two time points over one year, Maslach and Leiter (2008), found support for equity theory 
when at Time 1 those reporting a lack of fairness were found to be more likely to report burnout 
at Time 2. These studies lend support that if equity theory is predictive of police officer 
responses to stagnant or falling salaries, the longitudinal design of the study should allow for any 
changes to be identified.  
 Equity theory has been used infrequently in the policing, criminal justice and criminology 
literature.  More specifically, within the police organizational literature, equity theory has not 
been tested as a viable theory to predict organizational outcomes for law enforcement agencies.  
Nor does it have a history of being considered and rejected within criminal justice and policing 
literature.  Since its formal introduction by Adams (1965), it has been tested in the industrial 
organizational literature more than 160 times (Mowday, 1987, p. 93).  It has also been found to 
generally be supported in the underpaid condition, commonly included in management and 
organizational behavior textbooks (Bolino & Turnley, 2008, p. 31) and has been ranked as one of 
the more important of the organization behavior theories (Miner, 2003, p. 252). The following 
sections will summarize the limited influence of equity theory in criminal justice research and 
provide for a general summary of police organizational research.  
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Equity Theory in Criminal Justice and Criminology Research 
Equity Theory in Crime and Punishment 
Of the few examples of equity theory applied within criminology, perhaps the most high 
profile use was by Robert Agnew (1992) to address critiques of earlier versions of strain theory.  
Using equity theory as a guide Agnew (1992, p. 54) pointed out:  
Individuals in inequitable relationships may engage in delinquency in order to (1) 
increase their outcomes (e.g., by theft); (2) lower their inputs (e.g., truancy from school); 
(3) lower the outcomes of others (e.g., vandalism, theft, assault); and/or (4) increase the 
inputs of others (e.g., by being incorrigible or disorderly). 
 
  In a study of responses collected from 124 undergraduate and graduate students, DeJong, 
Morris, and Hastorf (1976) asked respondents to read a booklet with a short story of a robbery 
with one of eight different outcomes, some of which were more severe, ending in the killing of a 
restaurant owner.  In others one offender was much more responsible than the accomplice and in 
some cases one of the accomplices escaped and was not brought to trial.  The respondents were 
then asked to act as the judge in the case and issue sentences to the suspects based on the version 
of the story they read.  The study found support for equity theory in the attempts by the 
respondents to restore equity between victims and offenders and between offenders and 
accomplices. 
 In a similar way, Longshore (1979) used equity theory to test two constructs; inequity 
between an offender and victim and inequity between an offender and an accomplice.  This study 
involved 166 undergraduate students who were randomly provided a fictitious robbery scenario 
committed by two offenders and with one of eight different outcomes.  The students were asked 
to sentence the main character in the fictitious story to as many years in prison as they felt 
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appropriate, rate the seriousness of the crime on an eleven point scale and assign a percentage of 
the responsibility for the crime to each offender, totaling 100%.  The study found support for 
equity theory regarding inequity between the offender and the victim as the offenders were 
punished more harshly by the respondents for more serious crimes.  However, for inequity 
between the offender and the accomplice, support for equity theory was mixed.  Respondents 
were more lenient towards offenders when their accomplice was not caught, but were not moved 
to punish a suspect more harshly who was more responsible than their accomplice.         
 In a study examining the discrepancies between the views of criminal court actors and the 
opinions of the general public, Tremblay, Cordeau, and Quimet (1994) relied on equity theory to 
analyze their results.  The study utilized 299 residents who worked outside the criminal courts 
and 234 courtroom actors consisting of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys and probation 
officers in the Montreal, Quebec area.  The researchers anticipated both groups would attempt to 
restore victim to offender equity, but they theorized courtroom actors would take into account 
the risk for errors in convictions and return less severe punishments.  The respondents were 
asked to read five fictitious criminal cases and recommend sentencing in each case with options 
for fines, victim compensation, probation, community work and prison time.  As predicted by the 
study authors, criminal courtroom actors perceived the reestablishment of equity between victim 
and offender in sentencing required less punishment for the offender than the greater punishment 
the general public perceived was equitable.     
 Wagstaff and Preece (1997) tested three hypotheses, one of which was derived from 
equity theory, as possible explanations for preferences of over punishment or under punishment.  
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Respondents in the study, 80 undergraduate students, were asked what they felt was the 
appropriate sentence, and were forced to choose between a choice of over or under punishment 
of their sentencing choice in the fictitious crime sentencing scenario.  While there was no 
preference found for under or over punishment for a minor offense scenario, every respondent in 
the study chose over punishment for the offender convicted of the more serious crime of rape 
rather than under punishment.  This was different than the lack of preference the researchers 
anticipated and they concluded they failed to find support for their equity theory based 
hypothesis.   
 Equity Theory in Policing 
For the purposes of the current study, it is important to note the following studies which 
specifically speak to policing.  Even more important to note is the application of equity theory, 
which has historically been used as an individual level analysis, is in these instances used to 
explain agency level outcomes.  This use of equity theory for an agency level analysis is 
representative of the current study.   
 In a study of final offer arbitration outcomes between New Jersey municipal police 
departments and police bargaining units from 1978-1996,  Mas (2004b) found arrest rates were 
10% higher at agencies where officer police unions won at arbitration versus those agencies 
where police unions lost at final offer arbitration.  After controlling for changing crime rates and 
employment levels in the police departments, the effect was first noticeable three months after 
arbitration, typically peaked at eight months and lasted for at least 22 months (Mas, 2004b, pp. 
167-168).  In the study, the FBI UCR data used included only “felony crimes and arrests” (Mas, 
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2004b, p. 164), which is indicative of the less discretionary, UCR Part I arrest rates.  This lends 
support to the expectation that as municipal police officer salaries fall in relation to other 
regional municipal agencies, officers will likely respond by conducting fewer arrests.   It is 
important to note that the effect of the arrest rate discrepancies may be even stronger if the 
measure was based on the more discretionary arrests from Part II arrests instead of the less 
discretionary FBI UCR Part I arrests used by Mas (2004b). 
 Additionally, as Mas (2004b) observed, a causal cycle may present itself with a similar 
response delayed by several months, a peak displayed eight months later and with the possibility 
to remain visible for up to nearly two years.  Mitchell and James (2001) explain the initial delay 
in observing an effect is the causal interval or equilibration period.  This is followed by a 
stabilized effect or equilibrium condition (L. R. James, Mulaik, & Brett, 1982) and finally ending 
at a point where the probability of linking X as the causation of Y becomes uncertain, known as 
the entropic period (Kelly & McGrath, 1988). Though the use of the historical CJAP data set 
does not allow manipulation of the annual collection data points into the more sensitive points, 
such as the date of ruling in final arbitration found in the data set used by Mas (2004b), it may 
allow for some estimation into the beginning of the entropic period. 
 Looking specifically at police officers, McIntyre (1990) surveyed Vermont municipal 
police officers who quit their jobs to work elsewhere between fiscal years 1986 and 1988.  Of the 
32 possible reasons for leaving presented in the survey, the two highest scoring responses with 
somewhat or very important rankings from the study subjects were: 70% “to obtain better 
benefits,” and 69% “to attain better salary” (McIntyre, 1990, p. 10).  This indicates that for those   
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municipal police officers who actually leave an agency to work elsewhere, low salary can be an 
important motivating factor.  In addition to equity theory, police organizational characteristics 
and job satisfaction research provides additional insight into how officers likely respond to the 
underpaid condition.  
Police Organizational and Job Satisfaction Literature 
A substantial body of police organizational theory research has focused on identifying the 
structural characteristics of police agencies, identifying factors that explain their makeup and 
debating the influence of internal versus external influences on them.  Department 
characteristics, such as total staffing, annual expenditures and the task scope, influence an 
agency’s structure (Maguire & Uchida, 2000; Paoline & Sloan, 2003). Organizational age and 
two types of environmental features, dispersion and instability, also appear in the literature as 
influential on an agency’s structural characteristics (Maguire, 2003, pp. 214-215).  Structural 
characteristics of police agencies discussed in the literature include administrative density, 
formalization, and three types of differentiation.  Administrative density is a percentage of 
personnel employed in administrative tasks (Langworthy, 1986).  Formalization is a measure of 
the extent to which an agency utilizes formal written policies, rules and procedures (Hall, 
Johnson, & Haas, 1967).  Occupational differentiation is the proportion of a police department’s 
workforce that is made up of civilian employees without arrest powers versus sworn officers, 
sometimes described as “civilianization” (Crank, 1989, p. 167).  Functional differentiation 
measures to what degree a police agency utilizes specialized units or officers for select types of 
traditional law enforcement tasks.   Vertical differentiation, which focuses an organization’s 
hierarchal form and size, has  been measured as the proportion of sworn personnel at the rank of 
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sergeant or higher (Langworthy, 1985), a ratio of the chief’s salary to that of a starting officer 
(Maguire, 1997; Paoline, Terrill, & Rossler, 2014) and by counting the number of potential 
promotion levels from patrolman to the highest rank (Crank & Wells, 1991).  Unfortunately, the 
data for these structural characteristics is not available for each year or from each agency within 
this study.    
 The type of policing style law enforcement agencies employ, which may influence arrests 
per officer, is extensively covered in the literature.  Wilson (1968) described three types of police 
departments, defined by their handling of crime and order maintenance: watchman, legalistic or 
service.  Wilson’s three styles generally overlap with three of the four policing styles collectively 
described by Perrow (1967) as a framework for comparative analysis of organizations.  Perrow’s 
craft technology, routine technology and engineering technology formats are comparable to 
Wilson’s watchman, legalistic and service styles respectively, while his nonroutine technology 
had no direct equivalent (Langworthy, 1986, pp. 77-79).  Agencies employing a watchman (craft 
technology) style, focusing on major crimes at the expense of order maintenance, would likely 
have a negative influence on discretionary arrests by officers for minor offenses.  Those 
employing a legalistic (routine technology) style, treating order maintenance issues as strictly 
criminal matters, would likely experience a positive relationship with discretionary arrests by 
officers.  Service oriented (engineering technology) agencies, which prioritize all requests for 
service regardless of the type, would likely vary by community in their number of discretionary 
arrests for minor crimes per officer.  While extrapolations on arrests per officer can be made with 
knowledge of an agency’s policing style, the literature offers only a limited indication on how 
they may influence voluntary officer turnover.  Wilson’s (1968) observations of lower pay and 
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limited or preferential promotions at watchman type agencies, not found at legalistic and service 
departments, was suggestive of higher turnover for that style of policing.   
An employee’s mindset that he or she plans to separate from his or her employer in the 
near future, frequently referred by researchers as “intent to quit”, has consistently been found to 
be the best known predictor of whether or not an employee will voluntarily leave his or her job.  
This finding has been reinforced by three meta-analysis studies by Steel and Ovalle (1984), Tett 
and Meyer (1993) and Griffeth, Hom, and Gaertner (2000).  When intent to quit data is not 
available, as is the case in this study, it may be helpful to examine its most influential predictor, 
job satisfaction (Lambert, Hogan, & Barton, 2001).  Researchers have found this negative 
relationship between job satisfaction and voluntary turnover, specifically significant among 
police officers (Fielding & Fielding, 1987; Sparger & Giacopassi, 1983).  
Education level has an inconsistent history of mixed association with police officer job 
satisfaction.  Lefkowitz’s (1974) research at a Midwestern municipal police department found 
officers who had completed some part of a college degree were more satisfied with their pay and 
more involved with their jobs.  Education was not found to significantly contribute to job 
satisfaction in a study of 756 police officers at a southwestern police department (Griffin, 
Dunbar, & McGill, 1978).  Education did not influence job satisfaction or attrition in a study of 
more than 1500 Victoria (Australia) police officers (Sparger & Giacopassi, 1983).  Pre-service 
education was observed to be the largest contributor to officer job satisfaction at the Oakland PD, 
but while it shared a positive relationship at the Detroit PD, it was also the “least important 
factor” (E. S. Buzawa, 1984, p. 72).  In a study of 1472 officers at five agencies, Dantzker (1992) 
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found patrol officers with college degrees and up to five years of experience reported the highest 
job satisfaction, while equally educated officers with six or more years on the job reported the 
least.  Years later Zhao, Thurman, and He (1999) found no statistical significance for officer 
education on job satisfaction at a medium size police department in the northwest.  More 
recently, Paoline et al. (2014) found a statistically significant negative association for officers 
with a bachelor’s degree or higher education level on job satisfaction using a dataset from seven 
municipal police departments, all from different states.   
In an analysis of a survey conducted at a medium sized police department, Zhao et al. 
(1999) found the work environment provided by a law enforcement agency to a police officer 
was the most influential predictor of job satisfaction, not employee demographics.  Officer 
demographics were also found to be of little value when determining job satisfaction at16 
Alabama police agencies that participated in a survey conducted by Carlan (2007).  Finally, 
researchers of other types of officer occupational attitudes have also found only modest, weak or 
no association with employee demographics (Morash & Haarr, 1995; Paoline, Myers, & Worden, 
2000).  Organizational characteristics may be more influential.   
The size of a law enforcement agency may influence officer job satisfaction.  In the 
1970s, the Quality of Employment Survey (QES) was a nationwide survey of paid employees 
working 20 or more hours a week sampled across all job types.  Using 1977 QES data and after 
controlling for salary and fringe benefits, Idson (1990, p. 1007) found larger “establishments” (a 
single plant location or physical company location) to be less flexible in the ways they conducted 
business leading to lower employee job satisfaction.  In a similar finding within criminal justice 
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research, small agency size, measured by 100 or fewer sworn officers, has been found to be 
positively correlated with job satisfaction in an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) conducted with 
data from fourteen police agencies located in different states by Dantzker (1997).  If an agency 
had 101-500 sworn officers, its size was found to have a negative correlation to job satisfaction 
(Dantzker, 1997, p. 315).   
 In addition to pay and benefits , Sparger and Giacopassi (1983) found anger with police 
management and a lack of organizational sensitivity for input on decision making, recognition 
and promotion accounted for the majority of officer job dissatisfaction.  Utilizing a questionnaire 
sent to 581 Victoria (Australia) Police Officers who voluntarily quit before qualifying for 
retirement, 611 who retired with a pension and 500 who were still on the job, S. James and 
Hendry (1991) found those who voluntarily left early cited management decisions and 
dissatisfaction with policies as their primary sources of dissatisfaction.   
 To conclude, equity theory has provided a foundation as to how police officers are likely 
to respond to stagnant or falling wages.  It has been tested extensively in the industrial 
organizational literature (Mowday, 1987), but has rarely been applied in the criminal justice 
research field.  The job satisfaction research has solidified the link between job satisfaction, 
intent to quit and attrition.  Finally, the police organizational research has provided an overview 
of what may influence officers’ decisions to quit their jobs or conduct fewer arrests, to include 





CHAPTER THREE:  RESEARCH QUESTIONS, DATA AND METHODS 
 
 This chapter begins with a brief explanation of the research design used for the present 
study followed by a discussion of the unit of analysis and the data sets utilized.  The variables 
chosen for the analyses are explained and labeled.  The chapter concludes with a detailed 
discussion of the chosen statistical analyses, TSCS, along with a roadmap of how this type of 
analyses was chosen.  Appendix A and B are referenced for a more in-depth discussion of why 
group based trajectory modeling (TRAJ) and panel data analysis were not the appropriate 
analysis tools for the present study.   
Current Study  
Equity Theory Suggested Longitudinal Design 
 Longitudinal data from 11 consecutive years was chosen based on the recommendation of 
other researchers who have tested equity theory over time with fewer waves than what would be 
ideal (Taris et al., 2004).  As there is evidence that studies of much shorter duration were able to 
find support for equity theory’s anticipated responses to underpayment (Greenberg, 1990a), the 
present study with 11 years of data should be sufficient to identify if such a response by Florida 
municipal police officers and their salaries occurs.   
 In most of the equity theory research the same methodological limitation appears over 
and over again; almost all of it is short term in nature (Vecchio, 1982).  And as pointed out by 
Cosier and Dalton (1983, p. 317), “a longitudinal approach to the examination of inequity effects 
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is more appropriate than merely focusing on perceived inequity in a current time period.” For 
these reasons the present study’s use of longitudinal data over 11 years with annual data points 
should add to the limited longitudinal equity theory literature.  It is important to consider issues 
of time, particularly when events occur, as pointed out by Mitchell and James (2001, p. 545) who 
note, “We can and should do better.” 
Research Questions 
 
1. Does a municipal police agency’s pay falling behind other regional municipal police 
agencies lead to decreased work input? 
 
H1 = A municipal police agency’s pay falling behind other regional municipal police 
agencies leads to decreased work input. 
 
H0 = A municipal police agency’s pay falling behind other regional municipal police 
agencies does not lead to decreased work input. 
 
2. Does a municipal police agency’s pay falling behind other regional municipal police 
agencies lead to increased attrition? 
 
 H1 = A municipal police agency’s pay falling behind other regional municipal police 
agencies leads to increased attrition. 
 H0 = A municipal police agency’s pay falling behind other regional municipal police 
agencies does not lead to increased attrition. 
 
Unit of Analysis and Study Population 
 The unit of analysis in this study is the municipal (city) police agency located within a 
MSA in Florida.  This aggregate unit of analysis, municipal police agencies, was chosen over an 
individual unit of analysis, (police officers), based on data availability.  It should also allow for 
aggregate inferences, or those related to police officers collectively through the experience of 
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their employing department, to be drawn from the study.  Such inferences should be more useful 
for police administrators when making department wide decisions on police officer pay.    
While an attitudinal study might seem more valuable at first blush, such an approach 
would not serve the purpose of the present study.  Law enforcement managers are familiar with 
police officers complaining, as cynicism within the profession has been extensively studied in 
criminal justice research (Langworthy, 1987).  In addition, police officer behaviors’ have not 
always been found to be consistent with their attitudes (Worden & Shepard, 1996).  The value of 
this study is testing what law enforcement agencies experience in response to low or falling pay, 
not quantifying how much police officers see it as unfair or a point of irritation.   
A single officer’s voluntary action to reduce his or her work inputs or quit an agency does 
occur at the individual level.  However, when multiple officers’ behaviors change collectively, 
leading to a significant change in the normal distribution of work input and/or attrition that 
occurs at a police department, the end result is an organizational level experience.  This is 
particularly true if these changes are a response to an organizational policy, practice or 
management decision.  While one could envision a study that focuses on the responses of 
individual officers, why some responded one way while others responded another, this study is 
singularly concerned with the outcomes experienced by the agencies themselves.  Do falling or 
stagnant salaries influence attrition experienced by the agency?  Do falling or stagnant salaries 




 The variables used in this data came from two sources.  The salary and attrition data 
came from a statutorily mandated survey administered annually by the Florida Department of 
Law Enforcement (FDLE) called the Criminal Justice Agency Profile (CJAP) (Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement, 2013).  A special request was made to FDLE to obtain the 
historical survey data as only the past few years’ data was available online.  For the work input 
variable, UCR Part II arrests, a special request was made to the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Uniform Crime Reporting Program (FBI UCR) for the Arrest Master Files from 2001-2011 as 
this data is not available online.   Participation in the FBI UCR program is optional (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 2013) and although the vast majority of municipal agencies provided 
UCR part II arrest information every year of the study time frame, 28 of the 189 municipal police 
agencies did not provide information for at least one participating year and were excluded from 
the final analysis.  
Criminal Justice Agency Profile (CJAP) Data Set 
 FDLE began collecting salary, benefits, minimum education requirements, training and 
other variables from every law enforcement agency in Florida beginning with the passage of 
Florida State Statute 943.18 (Compensation and benefits study; recommendation) in 1996, which 
states:    
—The commission shall make a comprehensive study of the compensation and benefits 
paid to law enforcement officers and correctional officers throughout the state. Among 
the items to be researched shall be variation in salary scale, education and training of 
officers, retirement and pension programs, and any other factors on which compensation 
is based. The commission shall make recommendations to the Legislature for achieving 
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uniformity in compensation for officers with equal or comparable responsibilities, 
experience, education, and training. 
 For the CJAP data collection, every law enforcement agency in Florida is contacted each 
year by the FDLE.  The CJAP data was more useful for this analysis than the more commonly 
used U.S. Department of Justice’s Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics 
(LEMAS) survey, which collects only a few of the same variables, but has two significant 
limitations:  It only directly contacts larger agencies every three to four years and only samples 
the smaller agencies with less than 100 sworn officers (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2013).  For 
this study’s years of interest, 2001-2011, the LEMAS survey was only administered in 2003 and 
2007.  In comparison, the CJAP is administered annually and asks for the survey to be completed 
by answering questions reflective of June 30
th
 of the given research year (W. M. Doerner & 
Doerner, 2012a, p. 665).  It captures data on hiring requirements, number of sworn officers, 
officer demographics, types of insurance offered, minimum salary, supplemental programs, 
training provided, special units, benefits and type of retirement program offered. 
 The CJAP contains data on municipal, county and state law enforcement for every year 
from 2001-2011.  Additionally, as mentioned previously, differences in state law enforcement 
agencies such as the Florida Highway Patrol, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Florida 
Department of Insurance Fraud, county sheriff’s departments and municipal law enforcement 
agencies posed a threat to the internal validity of this analysis.  For this reason only municipal 
police agencies were chosen for this analysis.  For the present study the CJAP provided historical 
data for every municipal police agency in FL for the following variables from 2001-2011:  
Officer salary and attrition.      
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 The CJAP data set has only been used only a handful of times for social science research.  
It has been used to analyze the diffusion of accreditation among Florida law enforcement 
agencies using descriptive statistics and probit regression (W. G. Doerner & Doerner, 2009).  A 
panel data analysis was used to test the influence of unionization on county sheriff’s offices 
salaries (W. M. Doerner & Doerner, 2010) and municipal police agencies salaries (W. M. 
Doerner & Doerner, 2012a). W. M. Doerner and Doerner (2012b) again used the CJAP data set 
to conduct a random-effects Tobit analysis that determined that successful completion of police 
department accreditation did not increase clearance rates, but did lead to increases in the annual 
budget and number of sworn officers at  police agencies.  While not the sole focus of their 
research, the CJAP data set has been used several times as a limited reference in analyses by 
Mesloh, Henych, and Wolf (2008) to obtain police to citizen ratios, by Livingood, Woodhouse, 
and Wludyka (2009) to obtain data regarding the sworn strength of Florida police agencies, and 
by H. Smith and Banyan (2010) to obtain Florida police agency take home car policies.   
Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Data Set 
 In 1927 the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) started work on what is 
today the UCR.  The IACP first published its data in January, 1930.  Legislation was then passed 
authorizing the U.S. Attorney General to collect crime information and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) assumed the responsibility for the data collection and reporting in September 
1930 (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004b).  The primary motivation to establish the UCR 
was to counteract media generated “crime wave” publicity (Maltz, 1977).  Today more than 
18,000 law enforcement agencies provide data to the FBI UCR program annually (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 2013).  The UCR program collects summarized data on eight serious 
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crimes known as Part I offenses, data on arrests for all crimes, data on law enforcement officers 
killed and assaulted and information on hate crimes (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004b).   
After collection this information is summarized and published in annual reports.  One significant 
limitation of UCR data is that reporting is voluntary and this voluntary reporting leads to some 
missing crime data (Maltz & Targonski, 2002). 
Variables 
 Officer salary is the independent variable used to represent police officer wages.  The 
dependent variable arrests is used to measure police officer work input.  Attrition is used to 
measure officers quitting their jobs.  This section will provide detailed descriptions and a 
discussion as to why these variables were chosen and how they were measured.  Table 1 
summarizes the variable names, labels, descriptions, source and anticipated direction of change 





Definitions of Variables and Data Sources 
Variable Label Description Source Anticipated 
Direction 
Agency Salary Compared to 
Regional Agencies 
Salary Z - score above or 





UCR Part II Arrests Arrests Number of UCR Part 
II Arrests per Officer 
 
FBI UCR (-) 
Agency Attrition Attrition Percent of Sworn 
Officers who 






Officer Salary Compared to Regional Agencies 
 Underpaid workers experience less job satisfaction than their equitably paid counterparts 
(Pritchard et al., 1972). Salaries are important to police officers.  Rivers, Savery, and Soutar 
(1994, p. 253) found 61% of a sample of West Australian police officers felt their basic wage 
was the most important compensation factor while the next closest factor was the availability of 
long service leave at just 19%. 
 In order to interpret the results of the present study it is important to understand how 
police are paid and how it is different from many other professions.  It is extremely rare for 
police to be paid in any form other than hourly or salary.  In a rare instance the city of Orange, 
CA experimented with linking police officer salaries to crime reduction in the 1970’s, but did not 
stay with the system (Greiner, Dahl, Hatry, & Millar, 1977).  Generally the use of merit pay 
systems are rare in government (Milkovich & Wigdor, 1991).  In those rare instances it is used 
by law enforcement, it is typically followed by cynicism about their application (Johnson, 2012, 
p. 200).   
 In many professions, employees have some autonomy and individual control over their 
pay opportunities, sometimes through increased performance.  In police work, goals to achieve 
for additional pay creates a situation that is highly ambiguous and generally not feasible (Frey, 
Homberg, & Osterloh, 2013).  The performance measures by which to pay an officer tend to 
largely be out of his or her control such as crime rate in assigned area, which varies by 
neighborhood factors or number of arrests where people must violate the law in order to make a 
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lawful arrest (Besanko, Dranove, Shanley, & Schaefer, 2009, p. 484).  A good example in the 
Netherlands was translated and summarized by Thiel and Leeuw (2002); when performance 
measures for arrests and clearance rates were improving in the Netherlands, serious crime was 
also increasing, something the officer performance indicators did not reflect, pointing out the 
difficulty in creating performance measures that coincide with lower crime rates (Wiebrens & 
Essers, 1999).    
 One reason nearly all municipal police officers are paid in the same way is that it is likely 
a reflection of police agencies demonstrating isomorphism, as explained by institutional theory 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  As “highly institutionalized organizations” police departments are 
strongly shaped by their institutional environments in an attempt to attain legitimacy (Crank & 
Langworthy, 1992).  Many of them likely pay their officers hourly with no incentives simply 
because that is what all the other agencies are doing.   
 Some agencies offer a position called master patrol officer (or similar titles such as patrol 
officer 1, 2, or 3) to increase pay opportunities for line police officers (Zhao, Lovrich, & 
Robinson, 2001).  Many of those opportunities are not actual rungs on the rank structure ladder  
as they typically have no added supervisory responsibility (King, 2003) and because of this are 
likely part of the pay a line police officer anticipates once he or she has enough time on the job to 
qualify.  Though it occurs on rare occasions in police work, officers are typically unable to skip 
over ranks (Jacob, Cushenberry, & Grabarek, 2011; Maurer, Solamon, & Troxtel, 1998) in an 
effort to quickly increase their salary through promotion.  And unlike many other industries, 
police agencies rarely use past performance of an officer as a serious consideration tool in the 
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promotional process (Jacob et al., 2011). Further, there is some evidence to suggest many police 
officers are uninterested in police promotional process (E. Buzawa, Austin, & Bannon, 1994; 
Scarborough, Van Tubergen, Gaines, & Whitlow, 1999) and the more experienced a police 
officer is, the less likely the officer can picture himself or herself being promoted (Gau, Terrill, 
& Paoline, 2013).  In short, there are not enough promotional opportunities to compensate for the 
stagnant wages of an entire police force.  For these reasons, the opportunity for promotion is not 
viewed as a threat to this agency level analysis.   
 The independent variable of primary interest is officer salary (salary).  This variable is a 
z-score representing whether a given agency’s average starting salary for officers is above or 
below the mean for that of other agencies in the same region.  This will allow for salary inequity 
to be identified in a more meaningful way, comparing the salary of one agency only with those 
that an officer could easily consider working for without the significant effort and costs 
associated with moving to another region of the state.   
For the purposes of the present study, regional agencies are municipal law enforcement 
agencies located within the same MSA.  Most incorporated cities in Florida operate and maintain 
their own municipal police agencies.  Those municipal police agencies are typically located 
within a single county.  Groups of counties that are perceived to have strong communal and 
business interconnectivity are called MSAs.  By federal law and a 1951 executive order, the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is tasked with periodically updating MSAs and every 
10 years conducting a comprehensive review of MSA standards and definitions, the last of which 
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occurred in 2010 (Zients, 2013).  MSAs are defined by the OMB as follows (Sunstein, 2010, p. 
37252):  
Metropolitan Statistical Area—A Core Based Statistical Area associated with at least one 
urbanized area that has a population of at least 50,000. The Metropolitan Statistical Area 
comprises the central county or counties containing the core, plus adjacent outlying 
counties having a high degree of social and economic integration with the central county 
or counties as measured through commuting. 
 MSAs may be more simplistically described as regions within which a majority of 
residents regularly cross county lines to participate in social activities, business activities and 
commute to work.  Very rural counties that do not appear to have a high degree of cross-county 
commuting, business activity and social activity with the central counties of MSAs are not 
grouped into the regions defined as MSAs.  As seen in Figure 1, of the 67 counties within 
Florida, 44 are grouped into MSAs and 23 are not.  See Appendix C for a detailed listing of 
Florida’s MSAs.  MSAs do not form a distinction between urban and rural areas as many 
counties included within MSAs have urban and rural areas within the county borders.  
Predominately rural counties with a high percentage of residents commuting to a regional urban 
center for employment are included in that urban center’s MSA (Sunstein, 2010, p. 37246).     
As MSAs offer a snapshot of regional areas in which the majority of area residents live, 
work and commute; as such, these areas provide an opportunity to confidently calculate a 
regional average salary for police officers.  Municipal police officers who are looking for a new 
job or comparing their salary to other police officers are most likely to be looking within their 
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region at police agencies where the officer could reasonably commute.  For this reason, MSAs 
are the most appropriate conceptual boundary by which to define the regional municipal police 
agencies that are competing with one another for the same police officers and police officer 
candidates.  
 While MSAs were used for this analysis, the much less populated Micropolitan Statistical 
Areas (Micros) with commuting focused around a small urban population of more than 10,000, 
but less than 50,000 were not used in the primary analysis of the data due to concerns they did 
not contain enough municipal police agencies from which to draw study conclusions; however, 
they were used for a secondary analysis as a check on the robustness of the results from the 
MSA-only analyses.  Counties that were neither part of a Metropolitan nor a Micropolitan 
Statistical Area, or lacking an urban center of at least 10,000 people to which people regularly 
commute, were also not used for this analysis due to an insufficient number of regional 




Figure 1.  Florida metropolitan statistical areas map. 
 In addition to salary, a second independent variable salary (t-1) lagged by one year will 
be included in all models.   In a study that found changes in police officer behavior after winning 
or losing a contract for officer salaries at arbitration, Mas (2004b, pp. 167-168) found officer 
responses to be first measurable a full three months after the arbitration outcome.  This 
previously identified delayed response by police officers to salary news and the likely delays 
associated with applying for a new employer if an officer plans to quit working for his or her 
current municipal support the inclusion of salary (t-1).  This variable is a z-score that is 
calculated in the exact same way as salary except its relationship to the dependent variables will 
be evaluated one year later.  In other words, salary (t-1) represents whether a given agency’s 
average starting salary for officers was above or below the mean for that of other agencies in the 




 Agency UCR Part II Arrests per Officer 
 Generally speaking researchers have found the majority of an officer’s day is made up of 
discretionary time in which they choose what activities to spend their time doing and where they 
want to do it (Mastrofski & Parks, 1990) and resist “supervisory incursions into their 
discretionary domain” (Linn, 2009, p. 12).  Mastrofski (2004, p. 112) points out that controlling 
where an officer should be working, such as in hot spots policing, has been done with success, 
but forcing officers to undertake specific police actions within those locations has generally been 
met with considerable resistance.  Police departments are simply not structured in a manner that 
allows for the quality of an officer’s work to be closely monitored (Reiss, 1971).  Officers 
control quality and decision making in police work, as described by Bouza (2002, p. 6): 
Another one of the hidden truths about policing is that, although the brass can decide the 
general thrust and direction, the slug in the trenches retains the power to work her or his 
will in countless ways.  The result is that guidelines become rough limits, within which a 
great deal of independent action can be exercised.   
 
 In policing, discretionary decisions by officers on the street are both necessary and by 
their nature, difficult to control (Sykes, 1985).  Bittner (1970) described this discretion as 
“intuitive,” but intuitive is a somewhat abstract concept, making it difficult to control or attack.  
In fact, police officer discretion may be so strong that failing to reign it in may have been a 
contributing factor in the stalling of the police professionalism movement in the 1970s (Crank, 
2010; Manning, 1978).  The staying power of officers’ discretionary arrest activity regardless of 
management expectations likely allows it to be a useful way to find equity in seemingly 
unbalanced police officer to employer relationships.   
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 UCR Part II arrests are known to be significantly more discretionary than UCR Part I 
arrests.  UCR Part I arrests are inclusive of criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated 
assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft and arson.  Nearly all UCR Part I crimes have 
a specific individual or business as a victim.  Meanwhile, most of the Part II offenses listed in the 
UCR handbook typically lack a specific individual victim to the crime and the State or the 
community are typically considered the victim.  These can be seen in such examples as drug 
abuse violations, gambling, driving under the influence, liquor law violations, criminal traffic 
violations and curfew violations (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004b, p. 8). Though there are 
a few exceptions such as forgery and counterfeiting, fraud, and embezzlement that police officers 
do not have discretion to ignore, the majority of arrests for offenses categorized as Part II could 
be described as discretionary and optional for officers to either ignore or simply provide a verbal 
warning in lieu of arrest (Brown, 1988; Wilson, 1968).   UCR part II arrest data has been 
described and used to capture, “a mix of less serious felonies and misdemeanors” (Snow, Baker, 
& Leon, 1989, p. 536).  Enforcement of these Part II crimes, particularly the ones that lack an 
individual victim, is generally left to the officer to decide if any action should be taken.  Even if 
probable cause for an arrest exists,  police officers are generally provided the discretion to decide 
whether or not to effect an arrest for a misdemeanor crime (Kochel, Wilson, & Mastrofski, 2011, 
p. 477).   
Many of the offenses categorized as Part II such as criminal traffic violations, public 
nuisance, public intoxication and drug crimes may not even be discovered by officers if they do 
not actively seek them out.  In other words, when police officers do not want to work, many Part 
II offenses are the ones they will let slip.  For example, a study in Austin, TX found 40% of Part 
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II arrests were of homeless men (Snow et al., 1989, p. 537).  If police do not seek out the 
homeless or if they simply tell them to move along and rather than make an arrest, officers can 
measurably decrease their inputs and still keep their jobs.  Vingilis, Blefgen, Colbourne, and 
Reynolds (1986) saw this first hand when they found department morale problems were one of 
the top five DUI “arrest-inhibiting factors” for officers deciding to arrest or not arrest.  More 
serious Part I offenses are more difficult for police officers to ignore without risking their jobs.   
FBI UCR Part II arrests per officer data is used to operationalize reductions in officer 
inputs an agency experiences.  It is an available, reasonable measure to possibly identify a 
concerted agency wide effort by officers to reduce inputs and has been used successfully in the 
past as a measure of discretionary, proactive law enforcement activity (Johnson, 2012). Part II 
arrests in a given year are divided by the number of employed officers.  This establishes a rate of 
Part II arrests per officer for each agency and capture changes in the work inputs an agency 
experiences from each sworn employee.  For additional details, see Appendix D for a full list of 
all UCR Part II Crimes.   
Agency Attrition 
 McIntyre (1990) found that salary, benefits and retirement were the primary reasons 
municipal officers quit their municipal law enforcement jobs.  Competitive salary is one way an 
organization conveys appreciation to an officer for his or her work effort and participates in 
reciprocity with him or her in an employer to employee relationship.  While a lack of reciprocity 
from citizens towards police officers has been found to have no effect on officer burnout, a lack 
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of reciprocity from an officer’s own agency has been discovered to have a strong association 
(Kop, Euwema, & Schaufeli, 1999). 
The dependent variable attrition used in this study captures the attrition, described as a 
percentage of the total number of sworn officers for each given agency.  Agency attrition is 
reported by the Florida CJAP survey as total sworn officers who left the department for the given 
year indiscriminate of whether an officer separated as part of a planned retirement, an early 
retirement due to injury, a firing or simply quitting an agency for another job (Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement, 2013).  It is possible that in any given year, select agencies 
may have several planned retirements that are unrelated to officers quitting due to stagnant or 
falling wages.  Occasionally police agencies also attempt to downsize to save money without 
layoffs by offering early retirement incentives (Macinnes, 2010).  In a particular year, these 
actions can spike attrition in a single year and reduce the overall size of a sworn police force for 
reasons other than voluntary attrition in response to low salaries.  With more than 100 municipal 
agencies reporting every year over an 11 year period, such noise in a data set this large should 
not be a threat to the overall analysis.   
While it would be ideal to use an attrition variable that captures only officers voluntarily 
quitting before reaching retirement, such data is not available in the CJAP.   To calculate the 
attrition variable, the number of officers who left an agency in a given year is divided by the 
sworn personnel in that agency.  This creates the officer attrition rate or the percentage of the 




Chappell, MacDonald, and Manz (2006, p. 294) found a city’s overall crime rate 
positively influenced arrest rates for all index offenses (UCR Part I crimes), while the ratio of 
officers per residents negatively influenced them.  Officers per 1,000 residents and annual Part I 
crimes will be included in the present analysis as control variables.   Annual Part II crimes could 
not be used as a control variable because the UCR program does not collect this data, only arrests 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004a).  Part I crimes will be used instead as it has been 
theorized agencies experiencing more crimes have less interest in discretionary Part II type 
arrests (Mastrofski, Ritti, & Hoffmaster, 1987).  Annual Part I crimes and city populations for 
computing officer-to-residents ratios were obtained from the FBI’s UCR database.  The officer-
to-residents ratio was computed by dividing the annual CJAP agency sworn strength numbers by 
the UCR provided population data for the given year and then multiplying by 1,000.  
The size of an employer has been found to influence job satisfaction for employees 
(Idson, 1990) and specifically for police officers (Dantzker, 1997).  Total sworn officers are used 
as a proxy for agency size and included as a control variable.  The ratio of officers per 1,000 
residents, which is different from total sworn officers, is included as control variable for attrition.  
These control variables are included as job satisfaction known to be the most influential factor on 
an employee’s intent to quit (Lambert et al., 2001). 
In addition to a regular salary, another financial benefit found at many, but not all, police 
departments is a pension plan.  In Florida, the state managed pension is called the Florida 
Retirement System (FRS) and is portable for vested participants to bring with them to any other 
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participating city agency, but not to municipal agencies with locally managed pension plans 
("Retirement planning; A strong case for making the switch in Venice [Editorial]," 2006).  Local 
pension plans are not portable to another agency and could influence an officer’s view of their 
total financial compensation or their opportunities to leave one law enforcement employer for 
another.  For these reasons, both local and state pension plans will be used as control variables 
for both attrition and salary.  They will be coded as “0” when not in use by an agency and “1” for 
when it is the type of pension plan offered to officers.   
A Deferred Retirement Option Plan (DROP) provides an employee who would normally 
leave an agency at a typical retirement age, in a state or local defined benefits plan, the 
opportunity to remain on the job for years longer at their normal salary while simultaneously 
accruing pension payments.  DROP programs are intended to reduce attrition (M. W. Walsh, 
2004) and are financially enriching.  For these reasons it will be included as a control variable for 
both salary and attrition.  This variable is obtained through the CJAP database and will be coded 
as “0” if such a plan is not offered by an agency and “1” for when it is made available for 
officers to participate in.     
To account for non-salary expenditures beyond salary and pension, the availability of a 
take home car program is used as a control variable for salary.  Police agencies use this perk to 
attract and retain officers (W. G. Doerner, 1995) and such programs have been found to improve 
employee morale (Sheldon & Theodore, 1997).  A take home car program allows an officer to 
drive a police vehicle assigned to and from work leading to personal savings in gasoline and 
vehicle maintenance costs for the employee.  This variable was obtained from the annual CJAP 
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survey.  Other non-salary expenditure control variables for salary that are used in include annual 
vacation hours, sick hours and the number of paid holidays.  Law enforcement agencies in 
Florida differ substantially on this measure, ranging from no paid holidays offered at all to some 
that recognize more than those defined by the federal government.  In addition control variables 
for fully subsidized health insurance, partially subsidized health insurance, fully subsidized life 
insurance, partially subsidized life insurance, fully subsidized dental insurance, partially 
subsidized dental insurance, fully subsidized disability insurance and partially subsidized 
disability insurance are included in the analysis in an attempt to capture an officer’s full 
compensation.  These variables are obtained from the CJAP database and are coded as a 
numerical representation of the number of holidays officers receive additional pay for with a 
range of 0 to 16 within this data set.   
Two additional control variables were not influenced by the empirical literature on 
policing or equity theory, but rather are a statistical requirement of modern TSCS.  Including a 
lagged version of the dependent variable in a TSCS analysis is generally called for as part of the 
recommended statistical process (Beck & Katz, 1996).  For this reason, both arrests (t-1) and 
attrition (t-1) are used as control variables.  
Research Design  
 The present study uses a TSCS analysis which has been called one of the best types of 
quasi-experimental designs (Campbell & Stanley, 1967, p. 57).  The design for the current study 
uses data collected annually beginning in the year 2001 through the year 2011.   Florida 
municipal police agencies located within a MSA are the unit of analysis.  Of the 189 municipal 
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agencies that were in existence for all eleven of the years under study, 122 of them had no 
missing data for any of the study variables.  As all 122 of these units were included in the 
analysis, no sampling of the study population, Florida municipal police agencies located within a 
MSA, was required for this analysis.  Conclusions inferred from this study are directed to this 
specific study population.   
 The present study utilizes TSCS analysis to test the hypothesized outcomes as explained 
by equity theory.  This type of research design provides advantages over simple cross-sectional 
analysis through potential for detecting causal relationships and significantly increasing degrees 
of freedom (Worrall & Pratt, 2004a), as the present study uses the population and not a sample of 
all municipal police agencies in Florida within a MSA. 
Statistical Analysis 
 A type of panel design called TSCS analysis from 2001-2011 will be used.  A panel data 
set, such as the CJAP, follows a sample over time, which creates multiple observations for each 
case (Hsiao, 2003); however, different types of analyses are available for different types of data 
and research purposes.  Prior to analysis a determination was made that the data and the requisite 
model required is best categorized as TSCS analysis.  Detailed discussions on group based 
trajectory modeling (TRAJ) and a panel data analysis are discussed in Appendixes A and B 
respectively.  Briefly, TRAJ analysis is not an appropriate analysis for this study because the 
testing of two specific dependent variables, as opposed to groups, is of importance in this study; 
that is the proportion of the population following each group or the characteristics of groups are 
not the focus of this analysis.   Panel data analysis is not the most appropriate choice for several 
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reasons, chief among them being that the specific Florida municipal police agencies themselves, 
and not just a small sampling of municipal police agencies, are the focus of interest in this 
analysis.  A more detailed distinction between general panel data and TSCS data is discussed in 
the Time-Series Cross-Sectional Analysis section as well as Appendix B.  
 Time-Series Cross-Sectional Analysis 
  At times within the literature, the terms panel data and TSCS data, the latter of which is a 
type of panel data that requires TSCS specific handling, have been incorrectly referred to as if 
they are one in the same.  “Viewing panel data as a collection of n unit-specific time series or, 
alternatively, as a collection of T cross-sections, explains why economists and political scientists 
also call panel data pooled time-series cross-section (TSCS) data” (Andreß, Golsch, & Schmidt, 
2013, p. 63).  This can lead to confusion when distinguishing between panel data analysis and 
TSCS analysis.  As Beck (2001, p. 274) explains, “…much of the econometric literature 
conflates [emphasis added] the analysis of panel data with the analysis of TSCS data, it is critical 
to keep in mind the distinction between the two types of data.”   
There are three key distinctions between panel data and TSCS data.  First, as a general 
rule, panel data has large numbers of cross-sections (big N) and few observed units (small T) 
while TSCS has “reasonable sized T” and “not very large N” which will require some differences 
in the treatment of the data (Beck, 2001).  There is some debate as to what those size 
qualifications of T and N should represent as a minimum and maximum number of actual T and 
N observations.  However, an analysis of political science studies published between 1995 and 
2000 found a majority with TSCS datasets had a range of T from 10-40 and a range of N from 
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20-400, which was slightly different than datasets published in economic studies which tended to 
use even smaller T with larger N, on average, than political scientists (Adolph, Butler, & Wilson, 
2005, p. 4).   
Second, in the present study the units of analysis are Florida municipal police agencies 
and these units of analysis are themselves of specific interest, unlike a smaller sample typically 
used in panel data where the small sample itself is not the focus of interest, but rather the larger 
population from which it was sampled.   In TSCS analysis, Beck (2001, p. 273) refers to these 
conceptual focal points as “inferences of interest.”  The inferences of interest within this study 
are derived from Florida municipal police agencies.  This is consistent with TSCS data analysis 
and not consistent with panel data analysis.  This fine distinction between panel data and TSCS 
data is reiterated by (Worrall & Pratt, 2004b, p. 84):   
In the typical panel data set, the units are in themselves not the point of focus; rather, all 
inferences of interest are left to the underlying population on which the sample is based. 
In other words, inferences are not conditional on the sample. TSCS data are exactly the 
opposite, where all inferences are conditional on the observed units. For example, it 
would be difficult to conceive of sampling a ‘‘new’’ country, county, SMSA, or city of 
the same name. 
 A third distinction that is made by Beck (2001, p. 273) is as follows: With panel data, the 
small T does not justify contemplation of T →∞; however, “reasonable asymptotics in N,” or n 
→∞ or n →N can be contemplated.  With TSCS data a researcher can contemplate the possible 
outcome of T →∞, which will be done in this analysis, based on the large-T data.  Beck and Katz 
(2001, p. 2) sum it up best:   
This is to distinguish TSCS data from panel data. In particular, we have fixed, not 
sampled, units, and all asymptotics are in T, not N; T is large enough to do some time-
series analysis on the data.  
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 Published articles discussing TSCS models typically exclude the constant term, or y 
intercept, to simplify the notation (Adolph et al., 2005; Beck & Katz, 1995; Worrall & Pratt, 
2004a).  The Y intercept or α is omitted from the written equation, but is present as a parameter 
in the actual statistical models, as explained by Beck and Katz (2004, p. 2), “we suppress the 
constant term, which implies that the data have been centered; this is just to simplify notation for 
the time series models.”  Data is not typically centered for TSCS, nor has it been done for this 
study, however the use of fixed effects modeling “is equivalent to unit centering all 
observations” (Beck, 2008, p. 483).  Fixed effects are almost always used for TSCS (Beck & 
Katz, 1996), lending to the appropriateness of TSCS researchers typically omitting the constant 
term.  The basic bivariate TSCS model, with the y intercept suppressed is displayed in the 
following form.  Additional predictors can be added to create a multivariate TSCS model:   
 yit = βxit + εit;  i =1,…, N;  t =1,…, T, (1) 
where yit is the dependent variable (arrests or attrition) under study for agency i at year t, β 
represents the coefficient for the independent variable (salary), xi,t is the independent variable 
(salary) in the study and εit is the within-agency error.   
 There are two standard types of panel models available: fixed effect or random effect.  
The two models differ in their approach to consider the unexplained variance in the police 
department variable.  The fixed effects model essentially eliminates this variance from the model 
while the random effects model includes and estimates this variance.   When choosing between 
fixed effect or random effect model, in cases where a population is being analyzed as opposed to 
a sample, a fixed effects model is recommended (Kennedy, 2003, p. 312).  Under this model, the 
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covariance between the city and time variables is eliminated by design.  For TSCS, Beck and 
Katz (1996, p. 4) state they do not use random effects, noting TSCS data almost always deals 
with populations and not samples and explain, “they are not relevant in the TSCS case.”  
 In the present study, the entire population of Florida municipal police agencies within a 
MSA, and not just a sampling of those agencies, is analyzed.  With a fixed effects analysis, the 
results are limited to the cross-section units used in the analysis.  In situations where a sample is 
used, such a limitation can be problematic; however in a population study such as this one, a 
fixed effects analysis offers two distinct advantages:  First it addresses heterogeneity in the data 
set.  Second it addresses omitted variable bias.  A dummy variable for each unit (municipal 
police agency) and each time point (year) is added to the basic TSCS model, except for the first 
municipal police agency and first year to prevent perfect collinearity (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 
1991, pp. 224-226). 
 The fixed effects TSCS model can be displayed as:  
 yit = βxit + νi + κt + εit ;    i =1,…, N;  t =1,…, T (2) 
Where yit is the given dependent variable (arrests or attrition) under study for agency i at year t, 
β represents the coefficient for the independent variable (salary), xit is the independent variable 
(salary) in the study and νi is a dummy variable that controls for unmeasured, time-invariant 
differences, between municipal agency differences.  Then κt is a dummy variable that controls 
for between municipal agency, time-invariant differences and εit is the within-agency error.   
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 The modeling of a dummy variable that controls for time-invariant, between city 
differences addresses features one city may have, and others do not, that influence the dependent 
variable being analyzed.  The modeling of a dummy variable that controls time addresses events 
common to all the cities in the analysis during any particular year.  This will prevent 
contamination of the X-Y relationship in the model by random year-to-year variations (Worrall 
& Pratt, 2004a, p. 37).  In a statistical model that revolves around municipal police officer 
salaries, a downturn or uptick in the state-wide economy is perhaps the most likely threat a 
dummy variable for time will address.   
 Testing for estimation issues or problems is important when conducting a TSCS analysis, 
particularly for heterogeneity, temporal autocorrelation, panel heteroskedasticity, nonstationarity, 
spatial autocorrelation and contemporaneous correlation  (Worrall & Pratt, 2004a).  Beck and 
Katz (1996) point out that temporally correlated errors, spatially correlated errors and panel 
heteroskedasticity are problems particular to TSCS and in the past, all had corrections based on 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) as described by Parks (1967).  However, GLS cannot be used 
when the number of units exceeds the number of time periods under analysis as the model is 
unable to produce standard errors under such conditions (Beck, Katz, Alvarez, Garrett, & Lange, 
1993).  In addition, the correction for spatially correlated errors using GLS has been shown to 
lead to bad estimates of standard errors (Beck & Katz, 1995).  In the present study, with nearly 
122 municipal police agencies (units) and only 11 annual data points (time) for each agency, 
GLS is inappropriate.  OLS regression with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) with a 
Lagged Dependent Variable (LDV) is generally considered the standard recommended statistical 
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tool for analysis of TSCS data (Beck & Katz, 1996).  This TSCS model can be displayed in the 
following form: 
 yit = φyi,t - 1 + βxi,t + εi,t ;  i =1,…, N;  t =1,…, T (3) 
Where φyi,t -1 represents the dependent variable lagged by one year, β represents the coefficient 
for the independent variable (salary), xi,t is the independent variable (salary) in the study and εit 
is the error term.   
 OLS regression with PCSEs and a LDV will be used and the steps described in the 
following section will be taken to address heterogeneity, temporal autocorrelation, panel 
heteroskedasticity, nonstationarity, spatial autocorrelation and contemporaneous correlation.  
 Heterogeneity 
 Heterogeneity refers to unobserved differences between or diversity among the units of 
analysis which remain constant over time.  For example, unit-specific characteristic such as 
“rural” and “urban” vary among the cities in the analysis, but are characteristics that tend to 
remain relatively stable over time (Worrall & Pratt, 2004a, p. 37).  In the analysis of TSCS data, 
the use of a fixed effects model is described by Beck (2008, p. 483) as the “simplest way” to 
address this unit-to-unit mean and/or variance heterogeneity.  A fixed effects TSCS model also 
allows for a time-specific variable to capture the effect of events all cities in the analysis are 
likely experience together, such as a downturn or upturn in the economy.  For this reason a fixed 




 Temporal autocorrelation, also called serial correlation or serial dependence, refers to the 
association between or dependence of the values from one unit in one time period to the same 
unit from a different time period.  It is anticipated that the independent variable salary will be 
closely tied with one agency one year with the same agency during another year, or across time, 
as police budgets are closely tied with one another over time (Worrall & Pratt, 2004a).   The 
modern and simple way to address temporal autocorrelation is through the use of LDVs (Beck, 
2001, p. 279).  This method, as modeled above, is used to address temporal autocorrelation as 
long as the dependent variables are found to be stationary and the use of an LDV is theoretically 
appropriate, as discussed later in the nonstationarity section.    
Spatial Autocorrelation 
 Spatial Autocorrelation occurs when variable X at one location is correlated with variable 
X at another location.  This geographic clustering of observations occurs more frequently with 
data sets that use populations, such as TSCS data sets, than data sets composed of randomly 
sampled units (Mencken & Barnett, 1999).  A “spatial effects model” with a new independent 
variable created by averaging the “dependent variable on all contiguous units” (Worrall & Pratt, 
2004a, p. 40) and adding it to the model will be used to control for spatial autocorrelation. 
Contemporaneous Correlation 
 In the present study contemporaneous correlation refers to errors between two or more 
units (cities) that occur at the same time (year) and are associated with one another, but not with 
rest of the population.  In describing contemporaneous correlations, Beck and Katz (1995, p. 
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636) give the example of a cross-national study in which, “the economies of, say, the 
Netherlands and Belgium are linked.”  In the present study, while a downturn in the economy 
may affect all cities in Florida at the same time, the effects on traditional tourist destination 
cities such Orlando and Miami may be linked or associated more to each other than less 
traditional tourist destination cities such as Jacksonville or Tallahassee.   
 A Breusch-Pagan (1980) Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test should be conducted to test for 
contemporaneous correlation.  The LM test can be displayed in the following form: 
               ni
LM = Tr2ij
               ij 
 
(4) 
Where i = one unit (agency) and j = another unit (agency) and “r
2 
is the ijth residual correlation 
coefficient” (Worrall & Pratt, 2004a, p. 40).  The null hypothesis of this test states there is no 
correlation between the residuals of one municipal police department to other municipal police 
departments in the same year.  In other words, the null hypothesis states there is no 
contemporaneous correlation or no panel effect (Certo & Semandeni, 2006, p. 452).  If an 
analysis of the data determines the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, simple OLS regression 
will be appropriate for this analysis.  If an analysis of the data determines the null hypothesis 
should be rejected, the LM test can be viewed as being “decisive that there are individual 
effects” (Greene, 2003, p. 303) and PCSEs will be used to correct the problem of 
contemporaneous correlation by offering the most accurate coefficient estimates available.  
Research has reinforced the use of PCSEs in combination with a LDV for TSCS analysis 
in most cases (Beck, 2008; Beck & Katz, 2004; Keele & Kelly, 2006). PCSEs address 
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contemporaneous correlation by allowing the correlation to vary between units, something the 
oversimplified OLS model does not offer (Beck, 2008).  When a researcher only relies on 
dummy variables for each time period when using OLS , an assumption is made the correlation 
is the same among all the municipal agencies at each time point, but PCSEs allow for this 
correlation to vary which in turn allows the model to provide “more accurate coefficient 
estimates” (Worrall & Pratt, 2004a, p. 45).  
Panel Heteroskedasticity  
 Panel heteroskedasticity is a subtype of heteroskedasticity that is commonly found in 
panel and TSCS data where error variances or residuals across units are required to be constant, 
but violate this assumption by varying from unit to unit, often due to a time dependency (Worrall 
& Pratt, 2004a, p. 38).  To address this time dependency of the residuals, PCSEs allow for serial 
correlation to vary from unit to unit (Beck & Katz, 1996, p. 7).  The PCSE method itself is 
critiqued for violating the Gauss-Markov assumption that residual variance is constant among all 
predictors, but as pointed out by Beck (2007) addressing the method’s critics, PCSEs are used to  
correct an existing violation of the Gauss-Markov assumptions and when used for TSCS data, 
PCSEs provide the best estimation among all other available correction methods, to include 
GLS.   Beck and Katz (1995, p. 637) point out, “correction for contemporaneous correlations of 
the errors automatically corrects for any panel heteroskedasticity.”  In the present study PCSEs 
are used to correct for contemporaneous correlation which in turn also correct panel 




 Stationarity is a statistical assumption of TSCS analysis that the data do not vary, “simply 
as a function of time” (Beck & Katz, 2011, p. 333).  Providing a hypothetical scenario in an 
attempt to explain stationarity, Worrall and Pratt (2004a, p. 39) explain: 
It is well-known, for instance, that crime rates fluctuate over time. That is, they trend 
upward and downward over the long haul. Time series analysis assumes that this is not 
the case, which means that the data need to be forcibly made stationary. 
 When working with TSCS the dependent variable must be tested for stationarity prior to 
using OLS with a LDV, which should only be used with stationary dependent variables (Keele 
& Kelly, 2006, p. 203).  Stationarity in the dependent variable can be identified with the use of a 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1981) unit root test (ADF).  The null hypothesis states the variable 
being tested has a unit root and is therefore nonstationary (Hamilton, 1994).  If the null 
hypothesis can be rejected, the tested dependent variable is stationary and an LDV can be used.  
If not, techniques for co-integrated data must be used to control for problems associated with 
nonstationary dependent variables (Keele & Kelly, 2006).   
If the dependent variables in the present study (attrition and arrests) are found to be 
nonstationary, the first differences method will be used to forcibly make the data stationary and 
useful for TSCS analysis (Beck & Katz, 1996; Podestà, 2006).  Nonstationarity must be tested 
against both dependent variables as it is an assumption of TSCS analysis.  Similar to crime 
rates, Part II arrests may trend up or down over the long term and might not be nonstationary.   
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Plan of the Analysis 
For the first step in the analysis, an LM test will be conducted to identify 
contemporaneous correlation and/or panel heteroskedasticity.  The results of this test will 
determine if PCSEs or simple OLS regression will be used for each dependent variable.  The LM 
will be followed by an LLC test which will identify whether or not the data has a unit root.  If 
any of the dependent variables are found to have unit roots, they will be transformed using first 
differences.  Each dependent variable will then be analyzed separately using either PCSE with a 
LDV or simple OLS.   The first regression model for each will include year and city variables.  
Then a second model will be run using all of the control variables in the first model, but adding 
control variables for spatial effects.  An analysis of a third model will then be conducted to 
include Florida municipal police agencies located within a Micropolitan Statistical Area, adding 
those agencies to the Florida municipal police agencies located within an MSA.  The results of 
this third model will be included in a side by side table for a comparative analysis.  Finally a 
fourth model that includes only year 2008 data, the first year of a four year recession in Florida, 
will be run.  The results of this analysis will be placed in tables adjacent to the 2001-2011 years’ 
analysis results for comparison.  All 4 models will be run for each dependent variables attrition 





CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
 
To determine whether simple OLS regression could be used, a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) test was conducted for both dependent variables.  The null hypothesis of this test 
is that there is no serial correlation in the data.  In other words, the test assumes error terms 
between two or more cities are never associated with one another, at the same time, separate 
from the rest of the population.  The null hypothesis was rejected for the dependent variables 
attrition and arrests, indicating the presence of contemporaneous correlation and/or 
heteroskedasticity.  For arrests, the LM test produced a x
2
 value of 5694.91 with a significance 
of p = 0.000.  For attrition, the LM test produced a x
2
 value of 324.7 with a significance of p = 
0.000.  As a result, the use of simple OLS regression is not appropriate for attrition and arrests 
and PCSEs is more appropriate.   
In order to evaluate the assumption that dependent variables are stationary in a time-
series analysis, an ADF unit root test is typically conducted (Worrall & Pratt, 2004a).  Because 
this study contains both time series and cross sectional data a more advanced TSCS type ADF 
based analysis is required.  The Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) unit root test, often suggested for TSCS 
data, is not appropriate for this particular data set as it is recommended to only be used when 
“25-250” time series observations are available per unit (Levin, Lin, & James Chu, 2002, p. 3).  
Instead, the Im-Pesaran-Shin (IMP) unit root test has been shown in Monte Carlo results to 
perform well with a small T and is more appropriate for this study where T = 11 (Im, Pesaran, & 
Shin, 2003, p. 69).  
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The IMP test reports a W-t-bar statistic that can be explained as “the average of the t-
statistics from individual ADF regressions” (Levin et al., 2002, p. 9) within the TSCS data.  The 
IMP unit root test was conducted for the study’s dependent variables.  For both attrition and 
arrests, the IMP unit root tests both rejected the null hypothesis.  For attrition, the W-t-bar 
statistic is -3.4136 at 3 lags with p = .0003.  For attrition, the W-t-bar statistic is -2.9219 at 3 lags 
with p = .0017.  The null hypothesis states all panels contain unit roots and all are nonstationary.   
After rejecting the null hypothesis, an assumption must be made that all of the panels for 
variables attrition and arrests, do not vary, in part, as a function of time (Beck & Katz, 2011).  
Table 2 lists the descriptive statistics for the dependent, independent and control variables.   
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 Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean SD Min. Max. 
Dependent Variables     
   UCR Part II Arrests per Officer 16.958 11.626 .060 91 
   Officer Attrition Rate .119 .114 .000 1.300 
Independent Variables     
   Officer Salary as a Z Score .187 .903 -3.922 3.202 
   Officer Salary as a Z Score (t-1) .187 .903 -3.922 3.202 
Control Variables     
   UCR Part II Arrests per Officer (t-1) 
0 
16.954 11.526 .060 91 
   Officer Attrition Rate (t-1) .122 .118 .000 1.300 
   Take Home Car Program .640 .479 .000 1.000 
    Local Pension .760 .427 .000 1.000 
 
    State Pension .210 .410 .000 1.000 
    DROP Retirement Program .670 .470 .000 1.000 
    Annual Part I Crimes  1997.500 3740.699 5.000 35380.000 
    Officers per 1,000 Residents 
 
 
3.177 3.145 1.065 42.403 
    Total Sworn Officers 
 
81.900 131.343 1 1002 
     Annual Vacation Hours 89.340 34.117 0 240 
     Annual Sick Hours 87.730 32.791 0 480 
     Annual Paid Holidays 10.370 1.951 0 16 
     Life Insurance - Fully Subsidized .840 .371 0 1 
     Life Insurance - Partially Subsidized .100 .300 0 1 
     Health Insurance - Fully Subsidized .770 .423 0 1 
     Health Insurance - Partially Subsidized .170 .380 0 1 
     Dental Insurance - Fully Subsidized .400 .490 0 1 
     Dental Insurance - Partially Subsidized .280 .448 0 1 
     Disability Insurance - Fully Subsidized .430 .495 0 1 
     Disability Insurance - Partially 
Subsidized 
.180 .387 0 1 
 
 Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) are used in the final model as this method is the 
best known way to address panel heteroskedasticity in TSCS data (Beck & Katz, 1995).  PCSEs 
are employed with both city and year dummy variables, less the first city dummy variable and 
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the first year dummy variable to prevent collinearity.  The preferred use of a LDV to address any 
temporal autocorrelation for both of the dependent variables is employed (Beck, 2001).   The 
final model also includes spatial effects control variables for each city.   
 There were strong, positive Pearson correlations between UCR part II arrests per officer 
and UCR part II arrests per officer lagged by one year (0.851, p<0.01), officer salary as a z score 
and officer salary as a z score lagged by one year (0.859, p<0.01).  There were high levels of 
significant negative Pearson correlation between, local pension and state pension (-0.928, 
p<0.01) life insurance fully subsidized and life insurance partially subsidized (-0.750, p<0.01) 
and health insurance fully subsidized and health insurance partially subsidized (-0.833, p<0.01).  
Positive, but weaker Pearson correlations were found between UCR part II arrests per officer and 
annual part I crimes (0.124, p<0.01), dental insurance fully subsidized and health insurance fully 
subsidized (0.403, p<0.01) and dental insurance partially subsidized and health insurance 
partially subsidized (0.330, p<0.01).  Dental insurance fully subsidized and health insurance 
partially subsidized presented low levels of negative correlations (-0.339, p<0.01) as did dental 
insurance partially subsidized and health insurance fully subsidized (-0.288, p<0.01).   
An uncentered Variation Inflation Factor (VIF) test was also run for both the arrests and 
attrition models.   As a general rule, a VIF of 10 or more is considered excessive collinearity in a 
regression model (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006; Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Neter, 
2004).  For the arrests model, several city control variables and the following displayed a VIF 
>10: Local pension (504.87), annual paid holidays (87.75), state pension (71.71), average part II 
arrests per officer within county (36.06), annual sick hours (30.97), annual part I crime (28.33), 
70 
 
health insurance fully subsidized (26.84), life insurance fully subsidized (22.29), annual vacation 
hours (20.07), officers per 1,000 residents (18.11), UCR part II arrests per officer (t-1) (11.86), 
and DROP retirement program (10.73).  For the attrition model, local pension (587.94), annual 
paid holidays (89.69), state pension (75.66), officers per 1,000 residents (27.99), health insurance 
fully subsidized (26.77), life insurance fully subsidized (22.29), annual vacation hours (20.16), 
and DROP retirement program (10.83) all displayed a VIF > 10.  Exploratory Factor Analysis 
(EFA) was attempted, but only the continuous variables could be used as it is a required 
assumption of the technique (Bollen, 2014; Flora & Curran, 2004).   
For the EFA of the attrition model variables, officer salary as a z score (0.929), officer 
salary as a z score lagged by one year (0.927), and total sworn officers (0.550) grouped together 
as component 1. This component had a Chronbach’s alpha of (0.014).   The two salary variables 
measure the same thing, at different times, but total sworn officers does not have the same shared 
meaning.  Spatial officer attrition rate (0.873), officer attrition rate (0.836), and officer attrition 
rate (t-1) (0.510) represented component 2 with a Chronbach’s alpha of (0.627).  All three 
measure a similar construct.  Annual paid holidays (0.699), annual vacation hours (-0.684), and 
officers per 1,000 residents (0.511) combined for component 3.  It had a Chronbach’s alpha test 
score of (-0.061).  While paid holiday and vacation hours have a similar conceptual meaning, 
variable officers per 1,000 residents does not appear to measure the same construct.  The 
Chronbach’s alpha test for each exploratory component in the attrition model fell below the 
standard of α > 0.70.  Taking all of these issues into consideration, none of the variables were 
combined into a new factor. 
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For the EFA of the arrests model variables, UCR part II arrests per officer (t-1) (0.865) 
and spatial UCR part II arrests per officer (0.856) represented component 1 with a Chronbach’s 
alpha of (0.582).  Officer salary as a z score (0.933), officer salary as a z score lagged by one 
year (0.932), and annual part I crimes (0.550) grouped together as component 2. This component 
had a Chronbach’s alpha of (0.000).   The salary variables measure the same construct, at 
different time points, but annual part I crimes does not have a shared meaning.  Annual vacation 
hours (-0.760), annual paid holidays (0.644), and officers per 1,000 residents (0.487) combined 
for component 3 with a Chronbach’s alpha test score of (-0.061).  Variable officers per 1,000 
residents does not appear to share a conceptual meaning with annual vacation hours and annual 
paid holidays.  In the arrests model, the Chronbach’s alpha test results were less than the 
standard of α > 0.70.  In sum, these arrest model independent and control variables do not appear 
to warrant combining them into new factors.   
Because EFA and alphas demonstrated grouping the variables into a scale was not a 
viable option, those adding unacceptably high multicollinearity were removed from their 
respective models.  A stepwise process was utilized removing the highest VIF variable one at a 
time, beginning with local pension and working progressively downwards to the lowest scoring 
item as done successfully by other TSCS analysis researchers (Nair & Kotha, 2001; Pickering & 
Kisangani, 2005).  During this removal process, all of the high VIF city controls in the arrests 
model fell below 10 and remained in the analysis; however all of the other high VIF, non-city 
variables listed above were eventually removed.  The same held true for the attrition model.  All 
of the city controls fell below a VIF < 10 during the stepwise process while the high VIF, non-
city variables did not and were removed.   
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TSCS analyses often produce very high R
2
 values as, over time, the variables within these 
models tend to move together.  The identification of variables that contribute to the models is the 
focus of this study, not the overall R
2
.  The actual value of each model’s R
2
 is reported, but is of 
limited value to this study’s research questions.  The results can be seen in tables 3 through 8 










Determinants of Part II Arrests per Officer at Florida Municipal Police Agencies, 2001-2011 
Independent Variable    B SE 
      
Officer Salary    -.285 .422 
      
Officer Salary (t-1)     -.441 .407 
      
Take Home Program    -.622 .640 
      
Life Insurance Partial     .430 .557 
      
Health Insurance Partial     -.242 .453 
      
Dental Insurance Full    1.514* .652 
      
Dental Insurance Partial    .717 .552 
      
Disability Insurance Full    -.670 .540 
      
Disability Insurance Partial    -.699 .614 
      
Year 2002    .570*** .130 
      
Year 2003    1.824*** .092 
      
Year 2004    1.225*** .071 
      
Year 2005    1.918*** .069 
      
Year 2006    1.723*** .080 
      
Year 2007    1.497*** .066 
      
Year 2008    1.070*** .071 
      
    (table continues) 
     
Note:  Entries are OLS regression coefficients. The 121 city control variables, many of which are significant, are not 
listed for brevity.  N = 1342   
†




Independent Variable    B SE 
      
Year 2009    -.276 .190 
      
Year 2010    .703** .210 
      
Year 2011    .039 .095 
      
Model R
2
    .718***  
Note:  Entries are OLS regression coefficients. The 121 city control variables, many of which are significant, are not 
listed for brevity.  N = 1342   
†
p < .10   *p < .05; **p < .01 ***p < .001 
 
Officer salary failed to provide a significant, individual contribution to the model.  This 
outcome fails to reject the null arrests hypothesis,  H0 = A municipal police agency’s pay scale 
falling behind other regional municipal police agencies does not lead to decreased work input.   
A strong cultural belief among police that “law enforcement is their most important 
responsibility” (Paoline et al., 2000, p. 589) may contribute to officers’ decision not to reduce 
their individual rates of discretionary arrests, even when underpaid.  Unlike a factory worker 
who likely sees his or her work input solely benefiting the employer, an officer’s view of police 
work as a “calling” (Cooper, 2012, p. 174) to help the greater good may be too powerful to 
change his or her normal work inputs in an effort to off-set a stagnant or falling wage.  
It is important to note that while employees’ efforts to reduce their work inputs is one of 
the response options equity theory says an underpaid officer might take, it is not mandatory to 
find support for it.  In tests of equity theory, not all employees react the same way and some 
simply quit without any sign of decline in their work inputs (Valenzi & Andrews, 1971).  In 
some cases equity theory was supported when underpaid employees actually performed slightly 
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better than their overpaid peers, but instead displayed a higher propensity to quit their jobs (Finn 
& Lee, 1972).  In summary, this failure to reject the null hypothesis related to work inputs by 
underpaid officers does not amount to disproving of the value of equity theory in criminal justice 
research.  Instead it shifts the focus to attrition as a test of equity theory and may be a 
commentary of officers’ cultural views of their obligations to conduct discretionary arrests.  The 
equity theory arrests hypothesis is not confirmed with this Florida TSCS data set:  Hypothesis 1 
(H1): A municipal police agency’s pay scale falling behind other regional municipal police 




Determinants of Officer Attrition at Florida Municipal Police Agencies, 2001-2011 
Independent Variable    B SE 
      
Officer Attrition (t-1)    -.030 .073 
      
Officer Salary    -.648 .628 
      
Officer Salary (t-1)    -1.181* .592 
      
Take Home Program    -.403 .750 
      
Life Insurance Partial     -.568 .762 
      
Health Insurance Partial     -.169 .594 
      
Dental Insurance Full    -.162 .751 
      
Dental Insurance Partial    -.169 .671 
      
Disability Insurance Full    -.692 .567 
      
Disability Insurance Partial    -1.055 .682 
      
Year 2002    -.109 .170 
      
Year 2003    -.123 .135 
      
Year 2004    .054 .128 
      
Year 2005    -.052 .097 
      
Year 2006    -.075 .141 
      
Year 2007    -.161 .115 
      
    (table continues) 
      
Note:  Entries are OLS regression coefficients. The 121 city control variables, many of which are significant, are not 
listed for brevity.  N = 1342   
†
p < .10   *p < .05; **p < .01 ***p < .001 
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Independent Variable    B SE 
      
Year 2008    -.089 .111 
      
Year 2009    -.029 .284 
      
Year 2010    -.031 .448 
      
Year 2011    -.149 .423 
      
Spatial Attrition    .991*** .005 
      
Model R
2
    .572***  
Note:  Entries are OLS regression coefficients. The 121 city control variables, many of which are significant, are not 
listed for brevity.  N = 1342   
†
p < .10   *p < .05; **p < .01 ***p < .001 
 
 The inclusion of a take home car program, partially subsidized life or health insurance, or 
any type of dental coverage did not significantly influence officer attrition at the p < .05 level.  
Attrition (t-1), salary and the years 2002-2011 were not significant as well.  However, salary (t – 
1) and within county spatial trends demonstrated significant negative and positive relationships 
respectively.   
While salary did not influence attrition, salary (t-1) was significant with a -1.181 
unstandardized coefficient (p < .05).  Stated differently, for each one z-score unit an agency’s 
previous year’s officer salary falls below the MSA regional average officer salary, annual sworn 
attrition rate is estimated to be increased by 1.181% points at the 95% confidence level.  The 
1.181% is an unstandardized coefficient that represents the percentage of all sworn officers at an 
agency.  This finding supports the hypothesis that a municipal police agency’s pay scale falling 
behind other regional municipal police agencies leads to increased attrition.  This outcome  
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allows for the rejection of the null attrition hypothesis,  H0 = A municipal police agency’s pay 
scale falling behind other regional municipal police agencies does not lead to increased 
attrition. 
This is consistent with the prior literature in equity theory that quitting is one type of 
response employees’ display in response to an inequitable salary (Austin & Walster, 1974; Finn 
& Lee, 1972; Valenzi & Andrews, 1971).  This finding is also consistent with the behaviors of 
New Jersey police officers who displayed a negative response, delayed by months, after losing 
salary disputes at final arbitration (Mas, 2006).  The increased attrition rate fits with prior 
research among Vermont municipal police officers who cited salary and benefits as the two most 
important reasons they voluntarily left an agency (McIntyre, 1990).  The alternative attrition 
hypothesis is confirmed here:  Hypothesis 2 (H2): A municipal police agency’s pay scale falling 
behind other regional municipal police agencies leads to increased attrition. 
Although most of Florida is composed of counties located within Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas, there are seven Micropolitan Statistical Areas within the state. Within those seven 
Micropolitan Statistical Areas there were twelve municipal police departments, of which seven 
agencies had no missing data points or strongly balanced data.  Those seven cities were added to 
the analysis and the analysis was re-run for each of the three dependent variables.  The results of 





Determinants of Part II Arrests per Officer at Florida Municipal Police Agencies, 2001-2011 
Independent Variable MSAs Only  MSAs and Micropolitans 
 B SE  B SE 
      
Officer Salary -.285 .422  -.225 .461 
      
Officer Salary (t-1) -.441 .407  -.184 .449 
      
Take Home Program -.622 .640  -.350 .635 
      
Life Insurance Partial  .430 .557  .506 .563 
      
Health Insurance Partial  -.242 .453  -.345 457 
      
Dental Insurance Full 1.514* .652  .845 .622 
      
Dental Insurance Partial .717 .552  .261 .523 
      
Disability Insurance Full -.670 .540  -.732 .557 
      
Disability Insurance Partial -.699 .614  -.869 .674 
      
Year 2002 .570*** .130  .567*** .157 
      
Year 2003 1.824*** .092  1.942*** .116 
      
Year 2004 1.225*** .071  1.161*** .097 
      
Year 2005 1.918*** .069  2.300*** .099 
      
Year 2006 1.723*** .080  2.018*** .091 
      
Year 2007 1.497*** .066  1.488*** .101 
      
Year 2008 1.070*** .071  .900*** .081 
      
    (table continues) 
     
Note:  Entries are OLS regression coefficients. 121 city variables not listed, some significant, for brevity.  MSA 
Only, N = 1342.  MSAs and Micropolitan Statistical Areas, N = 1418.  
†
p < .10   *p < .05; **p < .01 ***p < .001 
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Independent Variable MSAs Only  MSAs and Micropolitans 
 B SE  B SE 
      
Year 2009 -.276 .190  .016 .203 
      
Year 2010 .703** .210  .394
†
 .222 
      
Year 2011 .039 .095  -.042 .107 
      
Model R
2
 .718***   .707***  
Note:  Entries are OLS regression coefficients. 121 city variables, some significant, not listed for brevity.  MSA 
Only, N = 1342.  MSAs and Micropolitan Statistical Areas, N = 1418.  
†




Determinants of Officer Attrition at Florida Municipal Police Agencies, 2001-2011 
Independent Variable MSAs Only  MSAs and Micropolitans 
 B SE  B SE 
      
Officer Attrition (t-1) -.030 .073  -.028 .066 
      
Officer Salary -.648 .628  -.654 .622 
      
Officer Salary (t-1) -1.181* .592  -1.126
†
 .592 
      
Take Home Program -.403 .750  -.396 .731 
      
Life Insurance Partial  -.568 .762  -.551 .778 
      
Health Insurance Partial  -.169 .594  -.112 .558 
      
Dental Insurance Full -.162 .751  -.071 .725 
      
Dental Insurance Partial -.169 .671  -.129 .652 
      
Disability Insurance Full -.692 .567  -.620 .562 
      
Disability Insurance Partial -1.055 .682  -1.000 .669 
      
Year 2002 -.109 .170  -.068 .163 
      
Year 2003 -.123 .135  -.065 .120 
      
Year 2004 .054 .128  .055 .111 
      
Year 2005 -.052 .097  -.058 .105 
      
Year 2006 -.075 .141  -.097 .126 
      
Year 2007 -.161 .115  -.162 .112 
      
    (table continues) 
      
Note:  Entries are OLS regression coefficients. 121 city variables, some significant, not listed for brevity.  MSA 
Only, N = 1342.  MSAs and Micropolitan Statistical Areas, N = 1418.  
†
p < .10   *p < .05; **p < .01 ***p < .001 
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Independent Variable MSAs Only  MSAs and Micropolitans 
 B SE  B SE 
      
Year 2008 -.089 .111  -.103 .111 
      
Year 2009 -.029 .284  -.004 .266 
      
Year 2010 -.031 .448  -.011 .413 
      
Year 2011 -.149 .423  -.161 .395 
      
Spatial Attrition .991*** .005  .992*** .005 
      
Model R
2
 .572***   .602***  
Note:  Entries are OLS regression coefficients. 121 city variables, some significant, not listed for brevity.  MSA 
Only, N = 1342.  MSAs and Micropolitan Statistical Areas, N = 1418.  
†
p < .10   *p < .05; **p < .01 ***p < .001 
  
After the addition of Micropolitan agencies to the arrests model, salary and salary (t-1) 
continued to have no significance.  However, the inclusion of the Micropolitan law enforcement 
agencies in the attrition model changed the salary (t-1) significance from the p < .05 level to p < 
.10.  To further explore this change, a panel regression model for attrition consisting of data only 
from the additional Micropolitan agencies for the same 2001-2011 years was run.  It found no 
statistical significance for salary or salary (t-1) on attrition.  This may explain the change. 
In 2008, the U.S. and Florida plunged into an economic recession (Bowley & Norris, 
2008).  To test how this may have affected the analysis, a regression model with only 2008 year 
data, to include the one year lagged independent variables previously used, was calculated and 
compared to the larger 2001-2011 data set for both of the dependent variables; arrests and 
attrition.   The following tables present the information for comparison using the final models for 




2008 Only Regression for Agency Part II Arrests per Officer versus 2001-2011 
Independent Variable 2008  2001-2011 
 B SE  B SE 
      
Officer Salary -4.529 2.900  -.285 .422 
      
Officer Salary (t-1) 3.965 2.908  -.441 .407 
      
Take Home Program 3.955 2.682  -.622 .640 
      
Life Insurance Partial  -1.835 3.539  .430 .557 
      
Health Insurance Partial  .313 2.962  -.242 .453 
      
Dental Insurance Full 3.578 2.863  1.514* .652 
      
Dental Insurance Partial 7.646 3.231*  .717 .552 
      
Disability Insurance Full -2.770 2.645  -.670 .540 
      
Disability Insurance Partial     -5.502 3.550  -.699 .614 
      
Year 2002 N/A N/A  .570*** .130 
      
Year 2003 N/A N/A  1.824*** .092 
      
Year 2004 N/A N/A  1.225*** .071 
      
Year 2005 N/A N/A  1.918*** .069 
      
Year 2006 N/A N/A  1.723*** .080 
      
Year 2007 N/A N/A  1.497*** .066 
      
Year 2008 N/A N/A  -.276 .190 
      
    (table continues) 
      
Note:  Entries are OLS regression coefficients. For 2008 only, N = 122.  For 2001-2011, N = 1342.  121 city control 
variables, some significant, not listed for brevity.  
†
p < .10   *p < .05; **p < .01 ***p < .001 
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Independent Variable 2008  2001-2011 
 B SE  B SE 
      
Year 2009 N/A N/A  -.276 .190 
      
Year 2010 N/A N/A  .703** .210 
      
Year 2011 N/A N/A  .039 .095 
      
Model R
2
 .102   .718***  
Note:  Entries are OLS regression coefficients. For 2008 only, N = 122.  For 2001-2011, N = 1342.  121 city control 
variables, some significant, not listed for brevity.  
†







2008 Only Regression for Officer Attrition versus 2001-2011 
Independent Variable 2008  2001-2011 
 B SE  B SE 
      
Officer Attrition (t-1) .222 .060  -.030 .073 
      
Officer Salary .928 1.575  -.648 .628 
      
Officer Salary (t-1) -2.425 1.568  -1.181* .592 
      
Take Home Program 2.691 1.449  -.403 .750 
      
Life Insurance Partial  .730 1.920  -.568 .762 
      
Health Insurance Partial  .189 1.604  -.169 .594 
      
Dental Insurance Full .147 1.546  -.162 .751 
      
Dental Insurance Partial .571 1.742  -.169 .671 
      
Disability Insurance Full -.011 1.466  -.692 .567 
      
Disability Insurance Partial -.832 1.954  -1.055 .682 
      
Year 2002 N/A N/A  -.109 .170 
      
Year 2003 N/A N/A  -.123 .135 
      
Year 2004 N/A N/A  .054 .128 
      
Year 2005 N/A N/A  -.052 .097 
      
Year 2006 N/A N/A  -.075 .141 
      
Year 2007 N/A N/A  -.161 .115 
      
    (table continues) 
      
Note:  Entries are OLS regression coefficients. For 2008 only, N = 122.  For 2001-2011, N = 1342.  121 city control 
variables, some significant, not listed for brevity.  
†
p < .10   *p < .05; **p < .01 ***p < .001
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Independent Variable 2008  2001-2011 
 B SE  B SE 
      
Year 2008 N/A N/A  -.103 .111 
      
Year 2009 N/A N/A  -.004 .266 
      
Year 2010 N/A N/A  -.011 .413 
      
Year 2011 N/A N/A  -.161 .395 
      
Spatial Attrition .895  .121***  .992*** .005 
      
Model R
2
 .484***     .602***  
Note:  Entries are OLS regression coefficients. For 2008 only, N = 122.  For 2001-2011, N = 1342.  121 city control 
variables, some significant, not listed for brevity.  
†
p < .10   *p < .05; **p < .01 ***p < .00 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the 2008-only analysis differed from the 2001-2011 analysis.  
Of note, salary (t-1) was not significant for the 2008-only attrition model.  Meanwhile the 2001-
2011 analysis found officer salary (t-1) provided a significant, negative influence on attrition at 
the p < .05 level.  An unexpected relationship change was found in the arrests model as control 
variable fully subsidized dental insurance was no longer significant for arrests.  However, 
partially subsidized dental insurance became significant for arrests at 7.646 at the p < .05 level.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION 
 
According to Adams’ (1963, 1965) equity theory, employees and employers participate 
in an exchange relationship with one another and desire fairness and balance.  This exchange 
relationship consists of inputs and outcomes.  Inputs from a police employee include work 
product, such as arrests, while outcomes for a police officer would include salary.  Equity theory 
anticipates underpaid employees will produce less work input for their employer and/or quit their 
job when they feel under compensated (Walster et al., 1978).  The following hypotheses were 
used to test equity theory in this study:    
Hypothesis 1 (H1): A municipal police agency’s pay scale falling behind other regional 
municipal police agencies leads to decreased work input. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): A municipal police agency’s pay scale falling behind other regional 
municipal police agencies leads to increased attrition. 
This study has potential applicability to the policing literature as it tests a well-
established industrial organizational theory in a law enforcement context, with a large, TSCS 
data set.  It is also an attempt to prevent the criminal justice field from “missing out” on an 
important theory found in another discipline (Cooper & Worrall, 2012, p. 387).  This testing 
using TSCS data sets is uncommon and considered by some researchers to be the best way to test 
equity theory (Cosier & Dalton, 1983; Mitchell & James, 2001). 
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Policing: Theory Implications 
This study attempted to add to the existing literature on policing by testing equity theory 
using a law enforcement specific data set to determine its potential value to criminal justice 
research.  This testing was influenced by calls by criminal justice researchers for more theory in 
policing (Cooper & Worrall, 2012; Mastrofski, 2004; Mears, 2010).  The results indicate equity 
theory has potential to explain agency level impacts police departments experience when their 
starting salaries vary significantly from others in their region.  Within this data set of Florida 
municipal police agencies for the years 2001-2011, salary influences attrition, but not work 
inputs per officer, operationalized by arrests.  The overall conclusion drawn from the analysis 
results is that equity theory explains a significant portion of police officer attrition rates 
experienced at the department level at municipal law enforcement agencies in Florida found in 
this 122 city data set.    
While equity theory has been tested extensively in the industrial organizational literature 
(Mowday, 1987) and has been referenced in policing literature to explain outcomes (Mas, 2004b; 
McIntyre, 1990), within the policing research it has never before been the exclusive testing focus 
for agency level outcomes.  While this study has found support of equity theory with a 
longitudinal criminal justice data set, to add value and clarity to the policing literature it should 
be empirically tested multiple times within the field of study (Hay, 2001).  Using data sets from 
other parts of the country, from different time periods and testing of additional work input 
variables could help bolster, or dispute, the support for equity theory found in this study.   
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It is possible that the lack of significance between salary and work inputs, measured by 
variable arrests in this study, might not be a reflection of a lack of support for equity theory, but 
rather could be attributable to modeling and measurement shortcomings.  The greatest threats to 
statistical conclusion validity in this study include unreliability of measures and unreliability of 
treatment implementation (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002, p. 45).   If unreliability of 
measures is responsible for the lack of significance, it is possible officers are reducing their work 
inputs when their salaries fall, but they may simply be doing it other ways.  For example, they 
may reduce the number of non-criminal traffic citations they issue, the number of miles they 
drive for proactive patrol or the amount of effort they put into follow up investigations all while 
continuing to maintain their individual rates of discretionary arrest inputs. The risk from 
unreliability of treatment application for arrests is most likely to arise from inconsistencies in a 
department’s style of policing (Perrow, 1967; Wilson, 1968) from one study agency to the next.   
The finding of significance for police officer attrition as a response to falling salaries was 
anticipated.  The finding of no change in UCR part II arrests per officer in response to falling 
salaries was not initially anticipated as a response predicted by equity theory.  It is important to 
note some researchers have found employee attrition without any reduction in work input as the 
equity response to the underpaid condition (Valenzi & Andrews, 1971).  Within the Florida 
municipal police agencies studied in this analysis during the years 2001-2011, police 
departments that offered salaries lower than their regional average experienced higher officer 
attrition rates.    
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The lack of a change in arrests per officer for minor crimes, Part II offenses, may indicate 
officers’ arrest work is primarily driven by other, more influential factors and on average it is not 
driven by salary.  Officer role adaptation, in which officers generally fall into individual arrest 
behavior patterns of zero, low, medium and high annual arrests rates, as studied by W. F. Walsh 
(1986), may be more influential.  It also may be that most officers feel the profession is a calling 
that instills a sense of obligation to make an arrest when needed and any feelings of a need to 
balance pay inequity are not strong enough to override that sense of obligation to arrest when 
they feel it is appropriate, even for minor crimes.  This finding, if supported by further testing in 
other regions, agencies and years, could be considered an “occupational culture” level 
contribution to the study of policing when viewed as a “filtering process” model, as suggested by 
Paoline (2003, p. 209).    
Police Management: Policy and Practice Implications 
All managers of police agencies whether a commissioner, police chief, mayor, city 
manager, city council member or similar position regularly must decide what is an appropriate 
starting salary to pay officers in their municipality.  There is scant research available to explain 
the outcomes of their choice of police salaries to draw insight from when making these decisions, 
yet they are made routinely, in every city.  This research should help provide a foundation for 
understanding of what might happen if municipal police officer starting salaries fall behind the 
regional average within their respective MSA.   
The results of the present study indicate salary, lagged by one year, appeared to influence 
attrition among Florida municipal police officers in the direction expected in this analysis, but 
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displayed no significant relationship to arrests.  At municipal police agencies in Florida, as 
officer starting salaries fall behind the regional average, defined by the agency’s MSA, officer 
attrition is likely to increase, but work inputs, measured by discretionary UCR part II arrests per 
officer, are unlikely to change.   The opposite is likely true if an agency offers a starting officer 
salary higher than the regional average.  For every one standard deviation above the previous 
year’s regional average starting salary offered, a municipal law enforcement agency is likely to 
experience less officer attrition equaling approximately 1.2% points of its total sworn strength.  
This is approximately 10% of the mean Florida municipal agency attrition rate.  An increase in 
salary is anticipated to have no change in arrests per officer experienced by the agency.   
When municipal police agencies located within the less populated Micropolitan 
Statistical Areas within Florida were added to the analysis, the results found the same negative 
relationship between salary lagged one year and a slightly lower rate of approximately 1.1% 
points decrease in attrition for each standard deviation of pay greater than the regional average.  
The inclusion of the Micropolitan areas also leads to a less robust significance at the p < .10 level 
as opposed to previous p < .05 level.  Those same agencies are also anticipated to experience no 
change in the largely discretionary, UCR part II arrests per officer their agency experiences.   As 
it was outside the scope of this study, it is unknown whether or not very rural municipal police 
agencies located within Florida, but outside of a Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Area, 
will experience any change in officer attrition or a change in the number of UCR part II arrests 
conducted per officer as a result of low or falling salaries.    
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At Florida municipalities, knowing attrition will increase by approximately 1.2% of the 
overall sworn strength annually overall for each standard deviation police officer starting salaries 
fall below the mean regional average has some practical value.  This should allow police 
managers to better anticipate additional costs not otherwise obvious in a decision to allow 
starting salaries to fall or remain stagnant.   Hiring, outfitting and training new officers to replace 
those who quit have an associated cost and that cost should be subtracted from anticipated 
savings anticipated from reducing or holding salaries flat.  This should lead to a more accurate 
budgeting as it relates to police officer salaries.   
The second important policy and practice implication is the lack of an effect of a lower 
starting salary on mostly discretionary, UCR Part II arrests.  The news is good for police 
managers.  Officers do not appear to reduce this type of work input for their employing agency 
when their salaries fall or are stagnant behind those of their regional counterparts.  Because of 
this, it does not appear Florida municipal police agencies need to devote any more resources than 
normal to monitoring discretionary arrest rates per officer if salaries fall behind regional 
counterparts.   
For municipal police agencies within MSAs, spatial effects suffered from high 
multicolinearity within the model for officer arrests with an uncentered VIF of 11.86.  Because it 
had VIF > 10 it was considered too high and removed from the analysis (Hair et al., 2006; 
Kutner et al., 2004).  However, for attrition, a substantially large spatial effect was observed with 
an unstandardized correlation coefficient of .991 at the p < .001 level.  The presence of within 
county spatial effects is important for the applied professional.  If other in-county municipal 
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agencies experience a change in attrition, a police or city manager can anticipate their municipal 
police agency will be more likely to experience a similar change.   
The lack of observed significance between UCR part II arrests and officer salary was 
unexpected, but not outside the scope of the equity theory literature.  Previous research has 
shown police officers in New Jersey conducted fewer overall arrests for their agencies after 
losing final offer arbitration hearings for salary negotiations (Mas, 2004a).  However, after 
further consideration, the circumstances are not entirely equivalent.  The loss of final offer 
arbitration includes emotional buildup and anticipation of improved wages and/or benefits.  Mas 
(2004b) found the less an arbitration offer was anticipated to win, the less the total number 
negative outcomes experienced by a police agency, including how far agency arrests fell.  At 
agencies that fall behind in pay, on average, the process is likely gradual and without the sudden 
loss experienced with a single, final offer arbitration ruling.  This may be why officers at Florida 
municipal police agencies were not found to react to flat or falling salaries with a response of 
conducting fewer UCR part II arrests.   
Another potential explanation for the absence of an effect of salary on arrests is that 
police officer arrest rates are resilient to change.  In the well-known Kansas City Preventive City 
Patrol Experiment (Kelling, Pate, Dieckman, & Brown, 1974),  arrest rates were unchanged even 
when drastic restrictions were placed on officer patrol patterns.  Research has also shown that 
most officers find law enforcement to be an important responsibility and find most officers 
believe good police work coincides with patrolling aggressively (Paoline et al., 2000).  Even Mas 
(2006) found dips in agency arrest rates after a loss at final offer arbitration disappeared after 22 
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months.  At the end of the day, officers may view making arrests as an obligation and unlike a 
factory worker withholding quantity or quality of items produced, it appears municipal police 
officers in Florida simply do not respond to pay inequity in an employer-employee relationship 
by withholding this type of work input.    
This is where the application of equity theory can add value to policing research.  Officer 
salary data is available for all municipal, county and state law enforcement officers in Florida 
through the annual CJAP.  The LEMAS survey offers salary information for officers every three 
to four years for all state and local law enforcement agencies employing 100 or more officers 
plus a sampling of all smaller departments.  One would also anticipate that most law enforcement 
agencies that are proactively cooperating with a research study will also make salary data readily 
available.  Equity theory can help explain a portion of officer attrition and can be used as a 
control variable allowing for more detailed analysis of other potential police attrition predictors.   
Limitations 
 The present study generalizations may be limited to Florida municipal police agencies as 
only data from Florida municipal police agencies were used in the analysis.  While MSAs and 
Micros may be inclusive of the bulk of municipal police agency recruiting, they are not inclusive 
of all police recruiting areas for municipal police officers within Florida as municipalities located 
in extremely rural areas were not included in this analysis.     
 Another limitation of the study is the lack of off-duty assignment information.  Equity 
theory explains that as police officer wages become stagnant or fall behind their regional 
counterparts, officers will attempt to increase their salaries (Walster et al., 1978).   It is logical to 
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believe working more off-duty assignments is one way officers will attempt to respond to flat 
police salaries (Burton, 1997) and the lacking of such a variable in this data set is a limitation.  
Research has shown that most workers who moonlight away from their primary job do so as a 
need to maintain their lifestyle (Smith Conway & Kimmel, 1998).  Juris and Feuille (1973) 
found the same is true for police officers moonlighting by working off-duty jobs; most are 
working them as a result of the need for the money to maintain their lifestyle and rarely for 
career advancement or other reasons.   
 A variable to capture off-duty work by police officers would be most valuable for an 
individual level analysis; however an argument can be made that in an aggregate level study such 
as this one, such a variable is of minimal value.  Assuming officers are unable to coerce private 
businesses into creating more off-duty jobs than they were already planning to offer, more 
officers requesting to work off-duty jobs from a pool of a fixed supply of off-duty jobs will not 
balance out the negative equity for salary overall.  On an individual level, this will also 
exasperate the pay inequity of officers who routinely relied on off-duty income but are given 
fewer off-duty jobs from the fixed pool due to additional officers requesting off-duty work.  For 
example, if there are police off-duty jobs in a given city valued at $1 million annually and they 
are typically worked by 200 officers, on average each of those officers could expect to earn an 
extra $5,000 annually.  If the following year officers’ salaries start to fall behind other regional 
agencies and now 400 officers apply to work off-duty jobs, the $1 million of off-duty work is 
split among more officers with the average participating officer now taking in only $2,500 
annually from off-duty work.  This is a net gain for officers newly participating in the off-duty 
work pool, but simultaneously a net loss for the 200 officers who routinely earned $5,000 each in 
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off-duty work in prior years.  It is also a net equal proposition for an agency as a whole at the 
aggregate level as $1 million came in the previous year from off-duty jobs and the same came in 
for off-duty compensation for the current year.  
 Although most non-salary expenditures were accounted for in this study, such as take 
home car program, partially subsidized life, health, and dental (including fully subsidized) 
insurance, not all possible expenditures were included.  Others were removed for high 
multicollinearity including state or local retirement plan, DROP retirement program, fully 
subsidized life and health insurance.  It is possible that some other unaccounted for differences 
between non-salaried compensation was influential in police officer’s decisions to quit their jobs 
or lack of influence the number of discretionary arrests they made.  An attempt was made to 
collect data on police department budgets to act as an additional control variable; however no 
state-wide data sets could be located with this specific information for all of the study years and 
with all of the study agencies included.  In order to collect the more than 1400 data points on 
police budgets, personal communication with each study police agency would have been 
required.  Receiving the cooperation from even a majority of the study agencies to research and 
respond with their historical budget information back to 2001 seemed an unlikely task to 
accomplish in any reasonable amount of time.  For this reason, the lack of the police agency 
budget as a control variable is a limitation of this study.  
 Change perceptions, a psychological equity response option to falling wages as explained 
by equity theory, cannot be measured as it was not captured in the longitudinal data sets 
available for the investigated 2001-2011 time frame.  An acceptable and available measure has 
not been identified that would properly capture a change of perception outcome.  This is a 
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limitation of using historical data sets for which such a measure was not captured.  In order for 
this variable to have been included in this analysis, someone would have had to ask all or at least 
a proper sampling of police officers, at all Florida municipal police agencies information 
pertaining to perception of their employee-to-employer equity balance each year of the study 
period.  This information was not available and for that reason the present study focuses on the 
two most common actual employee responses to reestablish an equitable relationship when 
salaries fall behind those of nearby agencies.   
While the use of UCR Part II arrests per officer as a dependent variable is useful to 
operationalize officer work input, it has some limitations.  Department culture and management 
styles have been found to explain variation in officer arrest rates (Mastrofski et al., 1987; D. A. 
Smith, 1984), however both variables are subjective and not available for this study’s 11 year 
data set.  One would expect an agency that follows a zero tolerance or “broken windows” 
approach (Wilson & Kelling, 1982, p. 29), focusing on arrests for minor crimes, would yield a 
positive influence on UCR Part II arrests.  Unfortunately, this information was not available for 
all 122 study agencies.  However other discretionary arrest control variables were available. 
Future Research 
 Procedural justice, an idea that has been extensively researched from a citizens’ 
perspective, could be studied from a police officers’ viewpoint in the area of compensation, 
particularly with stagnant or falling officer salaries.  As noted by Folger and Konovsky (1989, p. 
128)  , “…a key aspect of reward systems involves not only the what of rewards that equity 
theory has emphasized, but also the how emphasized by work on procedural justice.”  Testing of 
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deonance theory, a person’s natural response to injustice, often with anger, retribution and 
occasionally involving a response that could be categorized as a reflection of poor judgment 
(Folger, 2001; Folger, Ganegoda, Rice, Taylor, & Wo, 2013), would be another valuable 
contribution to the policing literature, particularly at agencies where salaries have been reduced. 
 This analysis was limited to municipal police agencies in Florida located within a MSA 
or Micro.  Testing equity theory in a similar manner among municipal police officers located in 
MSAs and Micros in other states throughout the country, particularly in regions other than the 
South, would be a significant continuation of this work.  It may be reasonable to believe that the 
attrition experienced at municipal police agencies with stagnant or falling salaries are likely to be 
experienced a other police agencies in other states, barring significant differences in regional 
policing.  Testing the responses of State and Federal law enforcement officers to falling or 
stagnant salaries would also add to the body of knowledge on this subject.   
An expansion of this work would be to include data from the Florida sheriff’s offices, or 
county level law enforcement agencies, in the analysis.  In Florida, sheriff’s offices tend to be 
full service police departments; however they are different from municipal police agencies in a 
few significant ways.  First, they are headed by an elected official (sheriff) who may be more 
sensitive to officer/deputy salaries or perhaps tax conscious voters.  Second, they tend to manage 
a jail as well which may influence the perceptions of deputies assigned to law enforcement duties 
to reframe their non-salaried compensation, possibly finding added value in their non-
supervisory assignments as working in the jail may be viewed as a less desirable alternative. 
Finally, since these county level law enforcement agencies tend to have overlapping jurisdiction 
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with local municipalities, law enforcement deputies may have more knowledge of pay inequities 
simply as a product of more cross agency contact.  Sheriff’s office data is available via the CJAP 
and UCR for the same time period analyzed in this study, 2001-2011.   
 Future researchers should consider investigating other effects of increased attrition when 
municipal police officer’s salaries fall behind the regional average.   Whether or not these 
additional, salary influenced losses of personnel effect police legitimacy, procedural justice 
and/or police-community trust would be of great interest.  If a relationship is found, the 
information could be useful for municipalities that are suffering from tight budget restrictions. 
 Finally, there are many avenues that could not be explored due to time and resource 
limitations that I hope others can build on.  These include the following questions:  How many 
officers have accurate knowledge of regional, referent salaries?   Does accurate or inaccurate 
information influence officer attrition?  The same question could be asked of decision makers 
who decide on police officer salaries.  Are they aware of the regional average pay for officers or 
are they making decisions on police pay without consideration of the marketplace?  Perhaps this 
information could be collected via a questionnaire and compared to actual referent salaries to 
determine if their knowledge or lack thereof, influences their decisions.  When agencies 
experience salary induced attrition, which officers tend to quit?  What do they have in common?  
Are they high quality, under performing or average officers?  Does salary induced attrition harm 
performance or quality measures at a police agency?  The questions are many and hopefully this 
study will influence other researchers to further explore the influence of officer salary inequity 
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Group Based Trajectory Modeling 
  
 Group based trajectory modeling (TRAJ) was developed in the 1990’s for analysis of 
developmental trajectory of behaviors by Nagin and Land (1993).  Later Daniel Nagin (1999, p. 
139) explained TRAJ with the following description: 
A developmental trajectory describes the course of a behavior over age or time. A group-
based method for identifying distinctive groups of individual trajectories within the 
population and for profiling the characteristics of group members is demonstrated. Such 
clusters might include groups of "increasers." "decreasers," and "no changers." Suitably 
defined probability distributions are used to handle 3 data types—count, binary, and  
sychometric scale data. Four capabilities are demonstrated:  (a) the capability to identify 
rather than assume distinctive groups of trajectories, (b) the capability to estimate the 
proportion of the population following each such trajectory group, (c) the capability to 
relate group membership probability to individual characteristics and circumstances, and 
(d) the capability to use the group membership probabilities for various other purposes 
such as creating profiles of group members. 
 A careful analysis of the abc’s of Nagin’s (1999) TRAJ capabilities, demonstrate they do 
not appear to be applicable or in demand for this analysis:  (a) The focus of this analysis is not 
about groups, but rather a test of 3 specific dependent variables, identified by theory, that 
expected to change in a known direction when the independent variable changes (b) There is no 
demand to estimate the proportion of the population following each group, because the response 
to a change in the dependent variable in a given year is the focus of the analysis, not groups (c) 
Group membership probabilities are not of importance here because groups, and more 
specifically characteristics of groups are not the focus of this analysis (d) Creating profiles of 
group members is not needed or necessary; the effects of a change in the dependent variable, 
officer starting salary, regardless of how it can be grouped, is of importance. 
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 TRAJ may be best summarized as an, “…approach for identifying distinctive clusters of 
individual trajectories within the population and for profiling the characteristics of individuals 
within the clusters” (Nagin, 1999, p. 139).  Profiling the characteristics of those agencies with 
salaries that have fallen below regional averages over time is not the intent of this analysis; in 
fact the characteristics of such agencies are not of particular interest for this analysis.  Rather the 
analysis is intended to test for several specific response behaviors or the dependent variables 
identified in the literature.  Arrests and attrition as predicted by equity theory, are thought to 
immediately follow changes in the independent variable, agency starting salary, according to 
equity theory.  This analysis is about testing theory, rather than being an exploratory analysis 
searching for common characteristics, as TRAJ is designed.  In fact an agency that has a general 
trajectory upwards in salary when compared to its regional counterparts, but has just two years of 
decline in comparative salary, could potentially demonstrate the predicted change in the 
dependent variables in the year during or immediately following the short term decline.  Such a 
response would add value to the analysis, strengthening the results, though with a TRAJ analysis 
the agency likely would have been grouped in the “high” trajectory group with better salaries and 
not with the “low” trajectory group. 
 The use of TRAJ typically coincides with the patterns or trajectories themselves 
identified as the dependent variables.  Some examples include (Griffiths & Chavez, 2004) where 
a grouping of neighborhoods which experience unique, mid-range levels of patterned violence 
distinctly different from the traditional low and high trajectory level violence neighborhoods, 
was identified possibly for the first time.  Groff, Weisburd, and Yang (2010) used eight 
trajectory groups as the dependent variable and once identified and plotted, found they were not 
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located spatially together.   Stults (2010) identified homicide trajectory groups first and then 
attempted to identify characteristics shared by members of the trajectory groups. In their work, 
Weisburd, Bushway, Lum, and Yang (2004, p. 296) used TRAJ for, “…exploring the patterns of 
change in Seattle data,” that led to the discovery that most street segments had stable crime 
trajectories over 14 years and only a small percentage influenced the majority of overall crime 
rate fluctuations.  And in the work of Corsaro, Hunt, Hipple, and McGarrell (2012), TRAJ again 
allowed for the creation of three crime trajectory groups, high, medium and low leading to three 
distinct impacts of the study’s treatment on the three pre-established crime trajectory groups.  
  TRAJ is best used when one needs to, “…identify clusters of individuals with similar 
developmental trajectories,” (Weisburd et al., 2004, p. 296); or when, “… identifying distinctive 
groups of individual trajectories within the population and for profiling the characteristics of 
group members” (Nagin, 1999, p. 139). TRAJ identifies trajectory groups first and then allows 
for the researcher to identify shared characteristics of those groups.  In this analysis, grouping is 
not under study.  Shared characteristics of any identified groups, beyond sharing the same or 
similar change in the independent variable, are not of significant importance either. In fact, in 
this analysis identifying trajectory groups first, as required by TRAJ is problematic.  First 
creating trajectory groups based on the three dependent variables will likely lead to the creation 
of three sets of groups, though equity theory only requires change in a minimum of one of the 
three dependent variables.  Additionally the dependent variables can be influenced by a 
multitude of unmeasured variables not captured by the existing data set.  For example, poor 
management could lead to higher attrition or a zero tolerance policing approach could lead to 










Panel Data Analysis 
 
 The units of observation within this analysis are at the agency level, specifically agency 
starting salary, agency UCR Part II arrests and agency attrition.  The unit of analysis is also at the 
agency level as seen in the research questions:  
1. Does a municipal police agency’s pay scale falling behind other regional municipal 
police agencies lead to increased attrition as measured by agency attrition? 
2. Does a municipal police agency’s pay scale falling behind other regional municipal 
police agencies lead to decreased work input as measured by UCR Part II arrests? 
As the unit of analysis is the agency and the interest is what occurs to the agency, not the 
individual officer, the cohort being followed is the observed agencies, not the observed 
individual officers.  In this analysis the units are “in themselves” the point of focus (Worrall & 
Pratt, 2004b, p. 84).  Year to year attrition and new hires each will slowly change the makeup of 
the individuals within the units of analysis, but do not change the makeup of the observed cohort 
group.  
 The 2001-2012 CJAP data set used for this analysis includes the population, rather than 
just a sample, of Florida municipal police agencies, and includes repeated observations of all 
Florida municipal police agencies for each year, excluding minimal missing data.  Therefore this 
data set follows a “true cohort” definition of a panel design rather than the “synthetic cohorts” 
definition of a TSCS design as described by (Andreß et al., 2013, 1.1.1.2 Separating Age and 
Cohort Effects," para. 2).  More specifically the data with a large number of individual units N 
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(300 Municipal Agencies) and observed annually over a short time period T (11 years, 2001-
2011) meets Baltagi’s (2008, "1.1 Panel Data: Some Examples," para. 1) definition of a micro 
panel.  The inferences of interest in the analysis are specific to the observed unit of analysis, 
Florida municipal police agency within an MSA, and the data can be best categorized as a TSCS 
data.  This calls for TSCS data analysis as opposed to a panel data analysis.  It should be noted, 
“Many of the same statistical techniques are used to model both TSCS and panel data” (Worrall 
& Pratt, 2004a, p. 35).    
 Examples of the use of panel data analysis specify the use of the same cohort is observed 
at multiple points.  This can be seen in the work of Begley and Czajka (1993, p. 553) who 
examined organization commitment on the effect of employee job satisfaction, intent to quit and 
health:  
Data collection took place at two points in time, 3 months apart. Of the 155 staff 
and administrators, 102 returned completed questionnaires at Time 1, for a 66% 
response rate, and 105 returned completed questionnaires at Time 2, for a 68% 
response rate. Eighty-two respondents completed questionnaires at both times, 
and this group constituted our sample. 
 There are two primary disadvantages to cross-section data over panel data, namely the 
direction of causation is difficult to infer and there is significant risk of omitted variable bias that 
is not significant with panel data (Winkelmann & Winkelmann, 1998, p. 2). Because panel data 
follows the same cohorts, it allows for control of unknown characteristics that are constant over 
time, and is essentially a pre-test post-test design (Andreß et al., 2013, "1.1.1.3 Controlling for 

















Florida Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
Table 9 
Florida Counties sorted by Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Florida Metropolitan Statistical Areas Inclusive Counties 
Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent Escambia 
 Santa Rosa 
Crestview-Fort Walton Beach-Destin Okaloosa 
 Walton 












 St. Johns 
Ocala Marion 






Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville Brevard 
Vero Beach Indian River 







Punta Gorda Charlotte 
  




Florida Metropolitan Statistical Areas Inclusive Counties 
Cape Coral-Fort Myers Lee 
Naples-Marco Island Collier 
Port St. Lucie-Fort Pierce St. Lucie 
 Martin 




Homosassa Springs Citrus 
The Villages Sumter 
 
The following Florida counties are not included within a Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(MSA) nor a Micropolitan Statistical Area (Micro):  Bradford, Calhoun, Columbia, DeSoto, 
Dixie, Franklin, Glades, Hamilton, Hardee, Hendry, Holmes, Jackson, Lafayette, Levy, Liberty, 


























Examples of Part II Arrests 
The UCR handbook  lists the following offenses as Part II (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
2004b, p. 8): 
Other Assaults  
Forgery and Counterfeiting  
Fraud  
Embezzlement  
Stolen Property: Buying, Receiving, Possessing  
Vandalism  
Weapons: Carrying, Possessing, etc.  
Prostitution and Commercialized Vice  
Sex Offenses  
Drug Abuse Violations  
Gambling  
Offenses Against the Family and Children  
Driving Under the Influence  
Liquor Laws  
Drunkenness  
Disorderly Conduct  
Vagrancy  
All Other Offenses  
Suspicion  
Curfew and Loitering Laws—(Persons under 18)  
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